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The field of international justice has evolved dramatically over the
last two and a half decades. After an initial start with prosecutions
before the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East held in Tokyo, the
field languished until the early 1990s when it resurfaced with the
creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)1 and the International Criminal Tribunal for
* Associate Clinical Professor, The Center for Global Affairs, NYU-SPS. Erin
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Rwanda (ICTR). Thereafter, a number of “hybrid” tribunals were
created including: The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL); a
hybrid State Court in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) as well as hybrid
chambers in Kosovo, East Timor, Senegal, and the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon (STL).2 Most of these tribunals have concluded or are
finishing their work prosecuting primarily high- and/or mid-level
perpetrators of crimes committed in their respective situation
countries.3 Meanwhile, the Rome Statute created a permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC)4 to prosecute atrocity crimes. It
currently has 123 States Parties5 with some prosecutions completed
and others in progress and numerous situations at both the
Preliminary Examination and Investigation phases.6 Furthermore,
increasingly, there are also domestic courts tackling war crimes
Lovall provided research assistance and Amber Lewis filmed the interviews of
most expert participants. See infra Appendix A. The following Center for Global
Affairs students/graduates transcribed audio/visual recordings of interviews:
Taylor Ackerman, Genesis Hernandez, Sabrina Diaz, Alexander O. Groskinsky,
Melissa Salyk-Virk, Sepideh T. Behzadpour, Hannah Barr, Fatima Zahra El Alami,
Heather A. Craig, Saarah Monawvil, and Yara Sayegh.
1.Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, September 2009, http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/
statute_sept09_en.pdf. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
January
2010,
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legallibrary/1001
31_Statute_en_fr_0.pdf.
2. David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
Cambodia: “Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L.
1, 2 (2007).
3. See Interview with Hassan Jallow, Former Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, in Nuremberg, Ger. (Sept. 29, 2016); Interview with David
Crane, Founding Chief Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone, in Nuremberg,
Ger. (Sept. 29, 2016) (explaining that new hybrid tribunals are being set up to
prosecute crimes committed in Kosovo, the Central African Republic, and possibly
South Sudan).
4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 91 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
5. The number dropped from 124 to 123 when Burundi officially withdrew.
See.Agence France-Presse, Burundi Becomes First Nation to Leave International
Criminal
Court,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
27,
2017,
8:34
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-toleave-international-criminal-court.
6. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/Main.
aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
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prosecutions from trials in Chile, Argentina, and Guatemala, to
specialized war crimes chambers created, for example, in Serbia and
Uganda,7 to domestic courts conducting prosecutions on a universal
jurisdiction basis.
Yet, the field of international justice is at something of a
crossroads. Several of these context-specific international and hybrid
tribunals are completing or have already completed their mandates.8
The ICC only issues a few warrants in each situation country, and the
goal of universal ratification of the Rome Statute still remains
aspirational following the first withdrawal from the Statute9 and
cynicism engendered by the failure of some of the most powerful
countries to join the court. When state actors oppose prosecutions,
there is sometimes dramatic “push-back” intended to derail the
court’s work.10 Even when international prosecutions occur, they fall
well short of addressing all perpetrators (often leaving victim
communities disappointed), take a lengthy period of time to
prosecute (if charges are at least somewhat comprehensive and fair
trial protections rigorously observed), and international and hybrid
tribunals are frequently criticized as extremely costly. Domestic
prosecutions in the countries where the crimes occur are susceptible
to being thwarted if there is insufficient political will or capacity; for
example, domestic prosecutions can be selectively targeted towards
non-state actors, lower-level perpetrators, and/or prior regime
7. Katya Salazar, Presentation at the Due Process of Law Found. in Turk.,
Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations in Domestic Courts: The Impact of
International Law and the Inter-American Human Rights System in Latin America
(Jan. 2014), http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/katya_salazar_presentation_
turkey.pdf; Development of Local Judiciaries, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/
outreach/capacity-building/development-local-judiciaries; International Crimes
Division, THE JUDICIARY, REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, http://www.judiciary.go.ug/
data/smenu/18/International%20Crimes%20Division.html.
8. Jennifer Trahan, The Future of the Field of International Justice, March 10,
2017, http://impunitywatch.com/report-of-symposium-on-the-future-of-the-fieldof-international-justice/. The ICTR, ICTY, SCSL, and panels in East Timor have
concluded. Residual capacity for the ICTY and ICTR resides in the Mechanism for
International Criminal Tribunals (MICT), and the SCSL also has a residual
mechanism.
9. See supra note 5.
10. See discussion infra Section 1.3(e).
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members, or thwarted by other means, or there simply may be no
accountability at the national level.11
How can the positive momentum that has been achieved in this
field over the past twenty-five years be maintained in the face of
such challenges? What is the best path forward for maintaining
positive momentum?
This study examines proposals for the future of the field of
international justice12—specifically, views regarding the best
tribunal(s) to address future prosecution of the worst atrocity crimes
(generally identified as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity).13 The study includes perspectives of some of the most
prominent global experts in the field—including many of the current
and former Prosecutors of the international and hybrid tribunals—
with a view to identifying the rationales offered for their preferences
regarding focusing future prosecutions at the ICC, within new hybrid
or other criminal tribunals, and/or at the national level.
The study is designed not to make an accurate prediction of the
future, but to trigger long-term reflection about the future
development of the field and the most effective ways to confront
current and anticipated challenges.
11. Trahan, supra note 8.
12. Id. By “the field of international justice,” this study means the current
international, hybrid, and domestic tribunals that prosecute the crimes of genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity along with additional transitional justice
tools. While domestic prosecutions of international crimes are more precisely
“national justice” mechanisms, they are also considered herein because they
provide a potential alternative or supplemental venue to international or hybrid
tribunal prosecutions. While this study does not focus on transitional justice
mechanisms other than prosecutions, it acknowledges the important contribution
they can provide to a country’s ability to address the aftermath of mass atrocity
crimes.
13. The crime of aggression can also be considered a core atrocity
crime. ”Crimes against peace” were prosecuted before the International Military
Tribunal held in 1945–46 in Nuremberg, Germany. See Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, London, Art. 6(a), 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (Aug. 8, 1945). The more
recent articulation of that crime, the “crime of aggression,” was adopted in an
amendment to the Rome Statute at the 2010 ICC Review Conference in Kampala,
Uganda. See Resolution RC/Res.6, advance version, 28 June 2010, 18:00. ICC
jurisdiction over the crime will activate on July 17, 2018. ICC-ASP/16/Res.5. For
definitions of the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, see
Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 6, 7, 8.
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This study is complemented by the findings of a “scenarios
workshop” on “The Future of the Field of International Justice” that
was held at NYU’s Center for Global Affairs, on February 10, 2017,
with approximately 45 expert participants, including legal advisers of
UN missions, NGO representatives, academics, and others. The
findings of that workshop are separately published.14

OVERVIEW OF POTENTIAL SCENARIOS OF THE
FIELD IN TWENTY YEARS
There are radically divergent views as to the future of the field of
international justice. This study will focus on three scenarios while
acknowledging that other scenarios are possible as are permutations
of the scenarios which, in any event, are not designed to be mutually
exclusive. While interviewees were asked to consider the future of
the field in twenty years, it is possible that a much longer timetrajectory might be needed to accomplish some of the goals.15
The first scenario to be examined is that the ICC will be the
dominant institution of the future to prosecute core atrocity crimes,
perhaps complemented by some hybrid tribunals and prosecutions in
national courts. This is the path—with the ICC as the central
institutional actor—that the international community and the United
Nations (UN) currently appear to favor. Yet, if the ICC is to be the
central institution of the future, would the ICC of the future resemble
the ICC of today, or would it differ in significant respects? How
could the ICC be strengthened against “push-back” against its cases
and/or attempts at politicization? Can the goal of universal
ratification of the Rome Statute be realized? And, if it cannot, how
does one defend a justice regime that leaves whole swaths of the
globe beyond its jurisdictional reach, exposing the institution to the
14. Trahan, supra note 8.
15. See, e.g., Interview with Gregory Townsend, Former Chief of the Court
Support Services Section, International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, in The Hague, Neth. (Oct. 3, 2016) (“For me it is rather a short term of
25 years when we compare to the 70 years, where we’ve come from since
Nuremberg.”); Interview with Matthew Gillett, Trial Lawyer, Office of the
Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, in The Hague, Neth. (Oct. 3, 2016) (“In
international law, 20 years is actually a relatively brief period; it can pass by before
you even notice it, so it’s right around the corner[.]”).
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perpetual criticism of providing only selective justice?
A second scenario is that, given the scope of atrocity crimes being
committed around the globe (e.g., in Syria, Iraq, Sri Lanka, South
Sudan), there will be a need for more dedicated country-specific
tribunals—for example, a future Syria Tribunal, a future Sri Lanka
Tribunal, etc. Can one make an argument for additional hybrid
tribunals to supplement the ICC’s work, or some form of
hybridization of domestic prosecutions (e.g., specialized war crimes
chambers with some international features)? Or, are there instances
when such hybrid tribunals might be the preferable mechanism rather
than the ICC? If hybrid tribunals are a desirable model for the future
then which hybrid tribunal has been our most successful model to
date and why? Could regional criminal tribunals also play a role in
prosecuting atrocity crimes, either in complement to the ICC, or not?
Finally, although they are generally disfavored on cost grounds,
could an argument be made—for instance, where an extremely large
number of crimes has occurred, as is the case with Syria16—that there
should be another ad hoc17 tribunal modeled after the ICTY and/or
ICTR (although not necessarily created through the Security Council,
as were those tribunals)?
A third scenario would be investing national courts with much
more capacity (and independence, to the extent this is possible), such
that they can successfully shoulder more atrocity crimes
prosecutions, with therefore less need for international or hybrid
tribunals. Since, by all acknowledgments, in many countries,
domestic prosecution of atrocity crimes done fairly and impartially
16. See generally Report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/36/55 (Aug. 8, 2017).
17. “Ad hoc” simply means they were created for a “particular situation.”
Given that all the existing international and hybrid tribunals (other than the ICC)
are similarly “ad hoc,” calling only the ICTY and ICTR “ad hoc” is somewhat
misleading. See Interview with William Schabas, Professor of Int’l Law,
Middlesex Univ., in Nuremberg, Ger. (Oct. 1, 2016) (“Actually the better way to
describe all these institutions is to say they are ad hoc. They are created for a
particular situation, particular circumstances. They’re temporary and actually they
all have mixtures of the international and the national even the Yugoslav and
Rwanda Tribunals[.]”). Nonetheless, this article will continue with the widely used
terminology of referring to the ICTY and ICTR as the “ad hoc” tribunals.
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presents considerable challenges, a secondary question becomes: If
this is the goal, how can it be accomplished? Is a centralized
mechanism or institution needed to coordinate the strengthening of
domestic prosecutions (loosely referred to herein as
“complementary”)?18 And, if so, which institution(s) should
coordinate such capacity-building work? Which institution(s) should
actually conduct such capacity-building work? And, how would
either be funded?
The study concludes by examining whether additional scenarios
should be considered and whether envisioning the scenarios as
alternatives is somewhat artificial, and one should instead consider
multiple layers of justice as the approach of the future (Scenarios 1 +
2 + 3, or 1 + 3). In any event, none of the scenarios excludes the use
of additional transitional justice tools (such as truth commissions,
vetting, reparations, and institutional reform)19 as well as
prosecutions in domestic courts using universal jurisdiction.

METHODOLOGY
The findings described below reflect primarily the results of
interviews the author conducted primarily in Nuremberg, Germany,
and The Hague, Netherlands, from September–November 2016. A
full list of interviewees is located in Appendix A. As noted above,
these findings are complemented by those from a scenarios
workshop held on the same topic at NYU’s Center for Global
Affairs.20
The scenarios examined raise numerous broad questions, and to
18. “Complementarity” within the Rome Statute system, refers to national
prosecutions in ICC situation countries. Yet, there is also need for the development
of domestic capacity to prosecute atrocity crimes in non-Rome Statute State
Parties—indeed, perhaps even more need since there will be no ICC-level
prosecutions in non-States Parties to the Rome Statute absent a UN Security
Council referral to the ICC.
19. VASUKI NESIAH, ET AL., TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND GENDER: PRINCIPLES,
POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES (Int’l Center for Transitional Justice 2006)
(“Transitional justice compris[es] five key elements: prosecuting perpetrators,
documenting and acknowledging violations through non-judicial means such as
truth commissions, reforming abusive institutions, providing reparations to
victims, and facilitating reconciliation processes.”).
20. See text accompanying supra note 14; Trahan, supra note 8.
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properly examine many of them would require multiple studies. This
project only attempts to provide an overview that identifies key
options and some of the merits of, or difficulties associated with, the
different approaches. This study also does not attempt to “test” the
views expressed—that is, if a prosecutor opined that hybrid courts, at
least those located in their situation countries, are better-positioned to
conduct capacity-building than a more remote tribunal, the opinion
was included but it was not “tested.” For example, one could also
imagine a hybrid tribunal contributing little to capacity-building,
even if located in the situation country, and a more remote tribunal
could make significant contributions to domestic capacity-building
despite its location.21
This study also does not contain a quantitative analysis, for
example, of cost per prosecution at each tribunal. While some might
be tempted to make decisions as to future tribunals on the basis of
cost and efficiency, a purely numerical analysis of that type would
fail to encompass many external benefits of high-level atrocity
crimes prosecutions.22 These include potentially contributing to
restoring the rule of law through fair trials, generating at least some
level of satisfaction amongst victim populations that justice has been
served, helping to establish an historical narrative, potentially
combatting denial of crimes, perhaps deterring future crimes, perhaps
contributing towards global deterrence beyond specific situation
21. The ICTY is acknowledged to have contributed to capacity-building in
Bosnia-Herzegovina by helping with the establishment of the hybrid State Court.
See, e.g., Capacity Building, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/
capacity-building (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
22. Interview with Carsten Stahn, Professor of Int’l Criminal Law and Glob.
Justice, Leiden Law Sch., in The Hague, Neth. (Oct. 4, 2016) (explaining that a
cost-benefit analysis that quantifies only how many perpetrators are prosecuted
would fail to measure many factors: “I think . . . that the cases being dealt with
[have] large repercussions on a multiplicity of agents: [H]uman rights agents, on
domestic courts, on civil society . . . [This] happens from the fact that the case is
taken on internationally. . . . It triggers new networks who actually then target this
type of atrocity; it alerts the media. I think these are the important effects that
cannot be measured simply in terms of the number of cases that these tribunals
actually do. So, the cost-benefit analysis is one which cannot be led only by
quantifying how many perpetrators are actually prosecuted and how many cases
even the tribunal does”).
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countries, possibly contributing to peace and security, and potentially
laying a foundation upon which future reconciliation may be built.
Despite a trend of attempts at analytical testing of the impact of
tribunals, it seems difficult to envision how such types of social
change could be quantitatively measured.23 Conversely, less costly
options for prosecution that may seem superficially tempting on a
cost per prosecution basis may involve tradeoffs in terms of fair trial
standards which may then generate added societal costs in terms of
not truly advancing accountability or the rule of law and thereby
failing to advance other potential justice goals and potentially even
weakening the stability of the state in question.24
The interview participants are not a neutral sampling of those
involved in the field of international justice with many participants
having served as international or hybrid tribunal prosecutors. Their
experiences undoubtedly shape their views. Also, the interview
participants are largely drawn from the international community with
limited participation from national jurisdictions.25 Additionally, no
direct victims were interviewed as part of this study although the
author recognizes that victims should have a significant voice in the
justice that is conducted in their name and which purports to serve
them.26 Most interviewees were male which appears to reflect the
dominant gender composition of prominent positions held in the field
23. Interview with Robert Petit, Founding Int’l Co-Prosecutor, Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in Nuremberg, Ger. (Sept. 29, 2016)
(opining on the value of leaving a tribunal’s archives to a country: “I think one of
the lessons from Cambodia . . . to be learned is that the impact of the court is not
only the judgment, but what happens after. The archives of the court, making
findings available, opening up the results of the whole institution, I think can also
have a major impact because it might allow people to find answers to their own
questions. . . . If the court does it right, it will have its impact with its judgments,
but it will also leave . . . a legacy of information, of evidence available. I think it
can help rebuild the country”). How would one measure such a value?
24. See Interview with Brenda Hollis, Prosecutor, Residual Special Court for
Sierra Leone, in Nuremberg, Ger. (Sept. 29, 2016) (a cost per prosecution analysis
would also fail to consider the massive numbers of victims whose crimes might be
covered by a single case).
25. See infra Appendix A. Sierra Leone’s Anti-Corruption Commissioner,
Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Joseph Kamara, did participate, along
with Hassan Jallow, formerly ICTR Prosecutor, now Chief Justice of The Gambia.
26. See, e.g., Interview with David Crane, supra note 3 (“Justice is for the
victims.”).
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with the notable exceptions of International Criminal Court
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and former Sierra Leone Special Court
Chief Prosecutor Brenda Hollis (also Prosecutor of the Residual
Special Court for Sierra Leone).27
Further discussion of the significance of this study as well as the
timeliness and rationale for conducting it are contained in Appendix
B hereto.

I. SCENARIO #1: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AS THE DOMINANT
INSTITUTION OF THE FUTURE
This was the first scenario presented to interviewees:
In the first scenario, the ICC is the dominant institution twenty
years into the future, in the field of international justice. The ICC is
not necessarily the only institution conducting atrocity crimes
prosecutions as there might be other tribunals (such as a few other
hybrid tribunals and/or possibly a regional tribunal) as well as
complementarity (national prosecutions in ICC situation countries)
or other national court proceedings. Yet, the ICC would be at the
“center of the stage” in terms of importance, and, thus, the main
judicial institution combatting core atrocity crime prosecutions. The
ICC of the future, however, would not necessarily precisely resemble
the ICC of today.28
Interviewees were then asked:
1. Is Scenario #1 the most likely scenario in twenty years’ time? Why or
why not?
2. What would the ICC of the future look like?
a. What are some key challenges for the ICC of the future?

27. See infra Appendix A. Former Sierra Leone Special Court Registrar and
Registrar of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone Bintah Mansaray also
participated.
28. As explained above, none of the scenarios rule out the use of additional
transitional justice tools (over and above prosecutions) nor the exercise of
universal jurisdiction in national courts.
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b. Are there potential impediments to the ICC’s future success?

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR SCENARIO #1
As set forth in detail below, various interviewees expressed the
view that Scenario #1 (a dominant ICC) was the most likely scenario
in twenty years. Some of the factors they cited were: (1) that the ICC
was designed to be the permanent tribunal for prosecution of the
worst atrocity crimes, obviating the need to create additional ad hoc
or hybrid tribunals; (2) that it is extremely costly, time-consuming,
and inefficient to continue creating new tribunals; (3) that states
generally view the ad hoc tribunals, such as the ICTY and ICTR, as
too expensive and therefore unlikely to be replicated; and (4) that a
multiplicity of tribunals causes fragmentation of the law.
Others expressed the view that Scenario #1 (a dominant ICC)
would be most likely only if coupled with Scenario #3
(complementarity/domestic prosecutions). While some opined that,
in theory, domestic prosecutions could ultimately replace the ICC, no
interviewees took the view this would occur in the next twenty years.
Various interviewees identified challenges for making Scenario #1
the dominant institution of the future. For instance, the ICC would
need: (1) to be a more efficient and effective institution (i.e., more
cost-effective); (2) expanded institutional capacity to handle more
preliminary examinations and investigations; (3) increased
cooperation by States Parties; (4) follow-up by the UN Security
Council as well as funding for situations referred by the Security
Council to the ICC; and (5) increased universality with more states
joining the Rome Statute and expanding the court’s jurisdictional
reach.29 Some noted that: (6) there could be potentially new crimes
added to the ICC’s jurisdiction;30 and (7) the ICC could serve as a
29. Ratification or accession by a state creates ICC jurisdiction over its
nationals and crimes committed on its territory and states may also lodge an
“Article 12.3 declaration.” See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
supra note 4, art. 12, 12(3). Referral by the UN Security Council also creates
jurisdiction. See id,, art. 13(b).
30. See id. at art. 5.1 (establishing ICC jurisdiction over four crimes, although
only three, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, have had their
jurisdiction activated, with crime of aggression jurisdiction activating July 17,
2018). There have been periodic proposals to add crimes to the Rome Statute,
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model of “best practices.”
Skeptics of Scenario #1 as the dominant scenario of the future
made several arguments, including: (1) the ICC’s limited capacity;
(2) the ICC’s high cost; (3) the ICC not being designed to prosecute
large numbers of individuals from any one situation country, such as
Syria; (4) world powers not ratifying the Rome Statute; and (5)
“push-back” and non-cooperation hampering the ICC’s work. The
most skeptical voice added the possibility of implosion of the ICC or
of the whole field of international justice.

B. DETAILS OF FINDINGS FOR SCENARIO #1
1. Proponents of Scenario #1 and Rationales
a) Designed as the Permanent Institution for Atrocity Crimes
Prosecutions
Unsurprisingly, key ICC officials, as well as others, supported
Scenario #1 as the dominant/most likely scenario twenty years from
now in the field of international justice.
For instance, founding Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR,
Richard Goldstone explained:
I’ve really got very little doubt that we are going to continue with the
ICC. I don’t believe there is any practical alternative. If the ICC were to
collapse I think we would be back to the pre-1990 period where there
would be complete impunity and there would be no international criminal
justice at all. That would, I think, be a tragedy for humankind. . . . [T]he
reason I’m optimistic for the ICC is, I don’t think there is any real
alternative. And if there wasn’t [an ICC], I think we’d all be working
around setting one up.31

such as additional war crimes, three of which were agreed to at the Kampala
Review Conference, and three more of which were agreed to at the recent 2017
ICC Assembly of States Parties meeting. See generally Jennifer Trahan, Potential
Future Rome Statute Amendments, 18 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 331 (2012)
(discussing proposed amendments); Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties,
Informal Compilation of Proposals to Amend the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2015).
31. Interview with Richard Goldstone, Founding Chief Prosecutor, Int’l
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia & Int’l Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, in The Hague, Neth. (Nov. 19, 2016).
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ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda expressed similar optimism:
I always say that one of the greatest moments of humanity I believe was
the creation of the ICC. I strongly believe that. I’m not saying this
because I’m the Prosecutor, but I’m saying it because I think it’s true and
I believe it. It’s my conviction that if we did not have the ICC, the world
would regress and it would regress to a worse place than where we are at
today.32

Former ICTY President, Judge Carmel Agius stated: “In my
opinion, we will come to a stage where it will be just the ICC, who
will . . . be the sole actor, protagonist on the scene of international
law. And I think it is very important that we get to that stage.”33
ICC Office of the Prosecutor Trial Lawyer and former ICTY
Office of the Prosecutor Appeals Counsel and Trial Attorney
Matthew Gillett opined:
[I]n terms of what is likely, given the amount of resources and time and
effort that’s been put into setting up the International Criminal Court, it is
going to be the first repository for the high-level cases in most situations,
unless there is some political reason that prevents it getting there. . . . So, I
think the likelihood is that the majority of situations will end up at the
new ICC and then there’ll be a certain number of additional situations
[for] which other solutions are found.34

b) Reluctance of States to Fund Further Ad Hoc Tribunals
Many participants noted that states seem to have rejected funding
future ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR, which have been
perceived as too costly.
For example, Judge Agius expressed skepticism that anything
resembling the ICTY or ICTR would be created, for instance, to
examine crimes occurring in Syria, not only for reasons of
32. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, in
N.Y.C., NY (May 9, 2017).
33. Interview with Carmel Agius, Judge & Former President, Int’l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in Nuremberg, Ger. (Oct. 3, 2016); see also
Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15 (stating, “The ICC would
probably be the most dominant court on the scene in twenty years’ time,” but also
noting that he saw all three scenarios increasing).
34. Interview with Matthew Gillett, supra note 15.
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“realpolitik”35 but also due to cost.36
c) Inefficiency of Creating Multiple New Tribunals
Others stressed the inefficiency of creating tribunals each time for
particular situation countries—which was one of the reasons the ICC
was created. Thus, Brenda Hollis explained: “I think one of the
advantages of a permanent court is that you don’t have to do what all
the other courts did and that is, you have to build from the ground up
in the sense of—you don’t have buildings, you don’t have a
courtroom, you don’t have vehicles.”37
ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda noted:
After the ad hoc tribunals were established there was this renewed energy
to again have a permanent independent institution, the ICC, that will be
there. It is permanent and ready to take action. We don’t have to go
through setting up a new tribunal and setting up a new court. It is
there[.]38

d) Fragmentation of the Law Through Multiple Tribunals
From a jurisprudentially oriented standpoint, Judge Agius
complained of the “fragmentation of the law” as a reason not to
create further hybrid tribunals:
The proliferation of various ad hoc tribunals, special courts here, and
special courts there, have not contributed much to the universality of
international humanitarian law or international law in general. If anything,
it has helped . . . to allow for fragmentation of international humanitarian
law and international law, which is not good.39

35. Interview with Carmel Agius, supra note 33 (opining that an ad hoc
tribunal for Syria was “wishful thinking” if created through the UN Security
Council due to “realpolitik” and also discussing the difficulty of having any
accountability if Bashar al Assad remains in power); see also discussion infra
Section 1.3(c) (“Inability to Prosecute Large Numbers of Individuals from Any
One Situation/Crimes as Vast as Those Occurring in Syria”).
36. Interview with Carmel Agius, supra note 33 (invoking the high cost of his
own tribunal as a reason it would not be replicated); see also discussion infra
Section 2.5.
37. Interview with Brenda Hollis, supra note 24.
38. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32.
39. Interview with Carmel Agius, supra note 33 (noting that when there is only
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Former Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and Legal
Counsel of the United Nations Hans Corell also stressed the need for
harmonization of the law: “I see that there will be more and more
need to have, shall we say, a harmonious law that applies in the
world.”40
e) Combining Scenarios #1 and #3
Others stressed that Scenario #1 could not occur in isolation
without Scenario #3, but that these scenarios needed to complement
each other. Thus, for instance, ICC Deputy Prosecutor James Stewart
explained:
I expect that in twenty years’ time, if we’re lucky, you’ll probably have
some mix of scenario number one and scenario number three. It’s
something we would like to see—a strengthening of national capacity in
response to what we call “statute crimes”—war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide.41

He thought the ICC would not be “the” dominant institution of the
future because domestic courts will complement it:
I hope we don’t see that the International Criminal Court is the dominant
institution. I suppose it could happen to a limited degree, if for whatever
reason States Parties to the [Rome] Statute waive jurisdiction. . . . But one
hopes that there will be a much more powerful response at the national
level. That’s the way the whole system was designed and you are
beginning to see that, I think.42

He predicted that in 50–100 years, maybe, the ICC would not be
needed but in twenty years he thought it would.43
the ICC, it will create only one body of law).
40. Interview with Hans Corell, Former Under-Sec’y-Gen. for Legal Affairs
and Legal Counsel, United Nations, in Nuremberg, Ger. (Oct. 29, 2016).
41. Interview with James Stewart, Deputy Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, in
Nuremberg, Ger. (Sept. 29, 2016); see also Interview with Gregory Townsend,
supra note 15 (“In my view I see scenario 1, the ICC increasing in role, and
scenario 3, domestic capacity being built, as probably certainly trends that will
continue[.]”).
42. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41.
43. Id. (“[M]aybe in fifty or one hundred [years] it will be very different [with
no need for an ICC], but in twenty years’ time I still think the ICC [will be]
playing an important role, but one hopes there will be[,] at the national level in
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Fatou Bensouda similarly opined that ICC capacity would not
diminish over the next twenty years:
It doesn’t mean the demands on the ICC, I do not see it diminishing in the
next twenty years. I do not see that because what I see is that [domestic]
capacity is still lacking. To a very large extent capacity is lacking at the
domestic jurisdictions. The politics are not always allowing for the
political will to try individuals who should be tried.44

Director of the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties,
Renan Villacis, also opined that, ideally, there would be no need for
the ICC because complementarity works. However, he saw Scenario
#1 as more likely for the next twenty-to-forty years:
[S]cenario three would be the ideal situation—that you would basically
not actually need the ICC except on very rare occasions because the
national systems would be taking care of the situations that would arise in
different countries. Now that would require a very large investment of
time, effort, and resources in [complementarity in] the coming decades.
And, though I think there are different actors out there that are trying to
develop this approach and who would like to reach that objective, it is
probably not likely that we will reach that situation in twenty, thirty, or
forty years. But we should continue to strive towards that. . . . [However,]
[t]he first scenario would seem, to me, at least to be the more likely one.45

Hans Corell also saw, in twenty years, a role for the ICC and for
complementarity, but only if national capacity is built: “I see the
need to develop the situation in a way that your reserve the ICC for
the real, shall we say, serious cases, and then have the principle of
complementarity. But again, that demands that rule of law is instilled
at the national level in countries.”46
2. Challenges to Making Scenario #1 Effective
Concerns were also raised that if the ICC were to be the dominant
or central institution of the future, it could not mirror the current
ICC, but would need to improve in significant respects.
every continent[,] a capacity to deal with these dreadful crimes[.]”).
44. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32.
45. Interview with Renan Villacis, Dir. of the Secretariat, Int’l Criminal
Court’s Assembly of States Parties, in The Hague, Neth. (Oct. 5, 2016).
46. Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40.
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a) Increasing Effectiveness and Efficiency (Responding to Cost
Criticisms)
Many interviewees expressed the view that the ICC needs to show
increases in effectiveness and efficiency.
Fatou Bensouda stated:
We have to be effective. There are many, many, many things that
challenge us for us to be effective, but we have to insist, including the
budget and not providing us with the resources, but we have to insist on
making a good job of this, in showing that the ICC is effective, that the
ICC can be relied on, showing the credibility of the institution. Because
one thing I say that, personally, when I leave the ICC, I want to have
brought it to that level, my office, where people can trust the office, they
can trust the court. I want for people to have no doubt that this institution
is indeed independent, impartial, and effective. It is doing its work. And a
lot of work needs to be done to show that. I believe that if that is shown it
will also convince other states that are still hesitating that this is an
institution that can be trusted because it is doing its work.47

For instance, former US War Crimes Ambassador, David
Scheffer, stated: “There has to be a basis for, I think, a more
accelerated process . . . and those are first in-house trial management
issues”: 48
[T]here’s a natural concern by countries like the United States just on the
efficiency with which the court is actually managing itself. . . . [Y]ou go
to an Assembly of States Parties meeting and you hear a lot of concern
expressed about, wait a minute, here’s the budget, how are you spending
it, and why do we only have this many convictions at this stage in the life
of the court?49

Founding Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
David Crane similarly opined as to the ICC:
I think it has to be seen as an efficient, lean, flexible, politically aware
organization. . . . If we can show efficiencies where needed, the cost is
easier to bear. The problem is now I think this is really where it started to
47. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32.
48. Interview with David Scheffer, Former U.S. War Crimes Ambassador, U.S.
Dep’t of State, in Nuremberg, Ger. (Sep. 29, 2016).
49. Id. The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) is the management, oversight,
and legislative body of the ICC.
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unravel with the ICC is people saying we’ve put X billions of dollars into
this court and we are getting [fewer] than five [trials], maybe six. But the
point is that eventually diplomats and politicians are going to start saying
“is this worth it?” and that’s where the scenario begins to unravel in a way
that none of us would like to see.50

The cost of the ICC was also raised as a repeat concern. For
example, Professor William Schabas51 suggested hiring a forensic
accountant to understand the full costs of the ICC:
I think insufficient attention is being given to trying to reduce the cost of
the institution and there is not enough assessing certain things that are
being done in terms of cost- benefit relationship. Instead of just arguing
“oh this is a good thing to have,” people should look and say well how
much did it cost? . . . [A]ll the victim lawyers appear to be doing in the
trials is standing up after the Prosecutor spoke and saying we agree with
the Prosecutor. So, if all they are is an echo chamber for the Prosecutor,
$3 million isn’t really worth it, but the point is it costs a lot more than $3
million because those lawyers stand up in court and speak, and it gets
interpreted, and people have to sit there in court, every minute in the ICC,
I don’t know, there’s a cost to it. There are fifty people in the courtroom
and around the courtroom at any given time so for every minute that the
victim representative speaks, there’s a cost. And they produce a lot of
paper because they reply to motions, and those motions get translated and
they have to be read then by the defense lawyers, they have to be read by
the judges, they have to be read by the Prosecutor, they have to be
answered, there are rulings that are issued, and nobody knows how much
this all costs. We need a forensic accountant to go and say here’s what
this business costs[.]
I’m sure if you went to those victims in the DRC and said to them, by the
way are you happy we are spending $10 million a year representing you
in these trials? I think they’d say couldn’t we just have the money? 52

50. Interview with David Crane, supra note 3 (adding critically, “I’ve never
seen so many busy people doing so little in my life. I mean, we’re just . . . not
getting the bang for the buck. . . . [F]rom an organizational-management point of
view it is slipping into a process-oriented organization”). Crane was also critical of
the ICC’s case selection under the first Prosecutor. He also discussed the political
and diplomatic work needed to successfully prosecute a head of state and the
importance of the timing of the indictment. Id.
51. Professor of International Law, Middlesex University, London; Professor
of International Criminal Law and Human Rights, Leiden University.
52. Interview with William Schabas, supra note 17. He was similarly critical of
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As to cost efficiencies, former Chief of the Court Support Services
Section, ICTY Registry, Gregory Townsend, pointed out that “big
trials are expensive,” and that, “on a cost basis, domestic [trials] will
always be more efficient.”53 He also focused on the need to appoint
experienced trial judges to tribunals.54
Hans Corell also opined that the ICC needs judges with more
courtroom experience:
I had hoped for more courtroom experience among the judges. The “list
B,” I’m rather suspicious of the “list B” because this means that diplomats
and professors who have never set foot in a courtroom can be elected to
the court. And this court is not on-the-job training. I mean, you need
judges who can really hit the ground running. . . . [A]cademia has an
important role to play here also, but it is not necessary that academia sits
on the bench all the time.55

He also expressed concerns about the ages of the judges.56
Matthew Gillett also spoke of the need for sound judicial
management to reduce the length of trials:
To reduce the length of trials whilst ensuring that justice is done for at
least the large majority of the serious crimes committed and that the
accused, the defense, are ensured a fair trial is an extremely difficult
balancing operation and one key factor in that is judicial management. It
is ensuring that the parties are focusing on the charges, that they are
leading [with] relevant evidence, and that the proceedings are not being
sidetracked into ultimately non-relevant issues. Hand in hand with that is
the idea of encouraging the parties to reach agreement on facts,
the overhead of the Trust Fund for Victims, the cost of administration of
justice/contempt cases, and translations into many languages. Id.
53. Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15.
54. See id.
55. Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40; see Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, supra note 4, art. 36(5) (describing “list A” and “list
B” judges).
56. Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40 (“I’m worried about the age of
the judges. I am 77 myself now. I was a criminal court judge in the 60s—ten years,
1962–1972. I would not consider myself competent to sit on a criminal court today
because I’m too old—my hearing, my eyesight, and so forth. You have to be
absolutely razor sharp when you sit on a criminal court. And also, [it is important
for the judges not to be] engaged in academic exercises, writing hundreds of pages
over months and months and months. Justice has to be delivered in, shall we say,
an effective manner.”).
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encouraging parties to allow the submission of witness evidence in
writing if it’s not critical evidence, so that the court can really focus on
the key adversarial issues that are dispositive to the case.57

b) Expanding Institutional Capacity
Others expressed the need for the ICC of the future to have
expanded institutional capacity, so that it may simultaneously handle
more preliminary examinations, investigations, and trial
proceedings.58 For instance, Gregory Townsend opined: “We will
have a larger, more robust ICC, I hope, able to handle more
concurrent situations, hopefully more geographically diverse, all
throughout the world amongst State Parties[.]”59
A contrary view was that, ideally, the ICC would exercise very
little capacity because complementarity would work shifting
prosecutions to regional, hybrid, and national courts. Thus, former
ICTR Prosecutor and current Chief Justice of The Gambia, Hassan
Jallow, opined:
The picture, which I see, which I hope, also, will be what will be there, is
every country being a State Party to the Rome Statute, and the ICC with
very little work to do and most of the work being done by the national
courts and the regional courts and the hybrid courts.60

As set forth above, however, while others suggested that capacity
should shift to national jurisdictions, they did not necessarily see this
occurring in the next twenty years.61
Professor Carsten Stahn62 suggested that even the threat of ICC
action could lead to domestic prosecutions so that the ICC would not
necessarily need to prosecute in each situation under preliminary
57. Interview with Matthew Gillett, supra note 15.
58. Interview with Richard Goldstone, supra note 31 (speaking of the ICC, he
states: “[T]here is . . . a limiting factor—the number of court[room]s. It’s a
problem facing all international prosecutors, and that is, you are constricted by the
number of court[room]s and the number of judges and the number of
investigators”).
59. Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15.
60. Interview with Hassan Jallow, supra note 3.
61. See supra Section 1.1(e).
62. Professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice, Leiden
Law School.
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examination.63 He opined: “I think this model is one of the most
important new developments that persons hadn’t foreseen at the
Rome Conference and making [the] most of these preliminary
examinations I think is something which is crucial for the future.”64
Professor Stahn thus suggests the ICC would not necessarily require
the capacity to prosecute each situation under preliminary
examination.
c) Increasing State Cooperation
Others noted that state cooperation with the ICC would need to
improve, for instance, reducing the number of outstanding arrest
warrants.65
As Renan Villacis explained: “The court cannot do everything that
we would like it to do because it has no enforcement mechanisms. So
it’s up to the cooperation of the states, in particular the States Parties
but also the other states who have supported the court.”66
As David Scheffer opined: “There has to be a . . . process that
compels better cooperation by certainly the member states of the
ICC. . . . It’s not enough for a prosecutor or the judges to speak in
legalese with governments and say, ‘you’re a member of this Rome
Statute, you are thus compelled under Part 9 to do XYZ.’ There has
to be, I think, just a more sophisticated approach to governments

63. Interview with Carsten Stahn, supra note 22 (“[S]ome think the fact that
the situation is under consideration by the ICC in itself might have certain positive
ramifications.”).
64. Id.
65. The ICC has 14 accused at large. See Situations and Cases, Defendants at
Large, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/defendants?k=At%20large.
Furthermore, some warrants have remained outstanding for lengthy periods of
time, particularly those regarding the Darfur situation referred by the Security
Council in March 2005); see, e.g., Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal
Court, Statement before the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in
Darfur (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=161213otp-stat-unsc-darfur (“Nearly a decade has passed since the first warrant of arrest
was issued by the [c]ourt in the situation of Darfur. . . . [I]t is with immense
regret that I acknowledge once again that all five suspects against whom warrants
of arrest have been issued by the International Criminal Court in this situation
remain at large.”).
66. Interview with Renan Villacis, supra note 45.
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today.”67
Former ICTY Prosecutor and current MICT Prosecutor Serge
Brammertz also saw non-cooperation, in terms of the failure to
execute arrest warrants, as a significant challenge for the ICC:
[T]he big challenge today is the non-arrest of the fugitives because if you
have international arrest warrants and you have no arrests it totally
undermines the credibility of the entire system. Now, can the ICC be
blamed for the non-arrest? Of course not. It’s up to the international
community, and, you know, the international community at a certain
moment has to decide what they want. On one hand, the very futureoriented decision about creating universal justice with the ICC is an
excellent idea. But it only can work if the same international community
is ready to do this extra additional step [of arrests].68

Judge Agius also stressed the importance of State Party
cooperation for the ICC to succeed:
I think some State Parties need to educate themselves better and mature
and behave like mature State Parties. . . . I cannot but mention the reaction
in Africa, particularly inside the [African Union], both when it came to
[Sudanese President] Bashir and, also, when it came to [Kenyan President
Uhuru] Kenyatta [both of whom were charged by the ICC]. And it’s not
the ideal of situations because, if you are a State Party, you pull the rope
of the organization and cooperate and cooperate.69

Judge Agius noted that it took the leverage of the European Union
(EU) to make countries in the former Yugoslavia cooperate with the
ICTY,70 and that the ICC did not have a comparable situation.71
67. Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48.
68. Interview with Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor, Mechanism for Int’l Courts
and Tribunals, Former Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, in Nuremberg, Ger. (Oct. 1, 2016).
69. Interview with Carmel Agius, supra note 33; see Prosecutor v. Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Omar Al Bashir), Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 (Mar. 4, 2009); Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir (Omar Al Bashir), Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 (July 12, 2010); Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC01/09-02/11, Notice of Withdrawal of the Charges Against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/0902/11-983.
70. First, the US conditioned financial assistance to countries in the region on
their cooperation with the ICTY (particularly as to arrests), and, later, the EU
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The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) recently adopted a “[t]oolkit
for the implementation of the informal dimension of the Assembly
procedures
relating
to
non-cooperation.”72
It
contains
recommendations for sharing information as to travel plans of those
against whom ICC arrest warrants have issued, and draft language
for States to use to try to dissuade such travel. NGOs, coordinated
through the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC),
have already been undertaking similar measures for years.
d) UN Security Council Follow-Up and Funding
Others noted the lack of UN Security Council follow-up,73
particularly as to situations referred to the ICC by the Security
Council—the situations in Darfur and Libya.74 They noted that the
Security Council must take more ownership over its referrals and
provide funding for them in the future.
James Stewart stated:
Another very notorious issue is consequences—consequences for not
cooperating with the court when the UN Security Council has referred a
situation. And so, failure . . . to arrest the fugitives who are fugitives
because of that referral, is something that has bothered us a great deal.
conditioned progress towards EU accession.
71. Interview with Carmel Agius, supra note 33 (“Sometimes this assistance
comes with strict strings attached. So, yes, there has been leverage [by the EU] on
these ex-republics of Yugoslavia to cooperate. [By contrast], the intervention of the
Union of African States is in defense of some of the persons who were being either
investigated or indicted, and that is exactly the opposite.”).
72. See Bureau on Non-Cooperation, Int’l Criminal Court Assembly of State
Parties, Annex II: Toolkit for the Implementation of the Informal Dimension of the
Assembly Procedures Relating to Non-Cooperation (Nov. 9, 2016), https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ICC-ASP-15-31-Add1-ENG.pdf.
73. See Interview with Stephen Rapp, Former Chief Prosecutor, Special Court
for Sierra Leone, Former U.S. War Crimes Ambassador & Head of the Office of
Global Criminal Justice, U.S. Dep’t of State, in Nuremberg, Ger. (Sept. 29, 2016)
(“[T]he record of Security Council referrals . . . Sudan/Darfur and Libya has not
been particularly successful[.]”); Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48
(“[A] lot of this rests on the doorstep of the Security Council in how to activate the
Security Council to follow through more effectively with its referrals to the ICC.”);
Interview with Serge Brammertz, supra note 68 (speaking of the non-arrest of the
fugitives regarding the Security Council’s referral of the situation in Darfur as “one
of the big challenges as well”).
74. See S.C. Res. 1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
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And it’s a point that the Prosecutor makes in no uncertain terms every
time she goes to the UN Security Council. We get a lot of sympathy. We
get a lot of positive response from individual representatives of individual
states of the Security Council, but very little united action.75

Deputy Prosecutor Stewart hoped that, through travel restrictions,
a fugitive head of state could become “kind of a pariah” who would
eventually fall out of power.76
Renan Villacis noted: “[T]he Security Council . . . has the
responsibility to ensure that the referrals [are] not just the one-time
matter, but supported by specific, concrete measures that assist the
court.”77
Hans Corell spoke of the crucial role the UN Security Council
could play in deterring warlords and dictators:
So, who could then make a difference here? The answer for me is very
simple: the most powerful organ that you can find in a sense in the world,
the Security Council of the United Nations. So, in my analysis, sooner or
later, I end up, in particular among the permanent five members of the
Security Council. What a difference they could make if they join hands
and decided there is now time to draw a line. And if this line is passed,
then we will join hands and act together.
Criminal justice is too—let’s get as many people in prison as possible.
No, the whole purpose of criminal justice is prevention—that normal,
ordinary people understand that if I commit crimes, then I might end up in
prison. The same thing, I think, applies in the world on the area of peace
and security—that if the Security Council could demonstrate just one or
two times that they go after the people who commit these deeds, then the
warlords and dictators around the world will start saying, “Hey, what’s
happening? Maybe they will come after me also.”78

75. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41.
76. Id. (“President al-Bashir of Sudan [is] a fugitive. We have arrest warrants
outstanding for him. Any suggestion that he is going to come to New York gets
the US Ambassador to the UN some power in saying some powerful things and in
a sense, it’s making a fugitive into a kind of pariah that can change the situation
within the country, which is probably the only solution for the surrender of
someone like him, if you think about, for example, the example of President
bWT53])W+ 5[ D]/yWzn”).
77. Interview with Renan Villacis, supra note 45.
78. Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40.
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Fatou Bensouda also noted there are many situations that deserved
referral and have not been referred:
With respect to referrals from the UN Security Council, it’s not always
forthcoming. The UN Security Council, being what it is, does not always
find it easy to make referrals. I think having referred Darfur, then referred
Libya, there have been many situations that deserve to be referred but
have not been referred.79

Interviewees additionally spoke of the need for the UN Security
Council to stop purporting to exclude funding from its referral
resolutions, as it has in the two to date.80 James Stewart explained:
[W]e would like at the very least financial support. Fatou Bensouda, the
Prosecutor, has made that point very clear to the Security Council because
when we get a Security Council referral, having done a preliminary
examination of the situation, if it’s our view [that] it qualifies for the
attention of the court—and in the two situations we are talking about,
Libya and Darfur in Sudan, they have—we’ve opened investigations and
we have conducted investigations and even brought charges. The strain on
resources is enormous[.]81

One interviewee expressed the view that UN Security Council
referrals should be abolished.82

79. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32.
80. See S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2005) (providing “that none of the
expenses incurred in connection with the referral including expenses related to
investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the
United Nations[.]”); S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 74, ¶ 8 (similar). In the author’s
view, these resolutions only “purportedly” deny UN funding, as the General
Assembly, under the UN Charter, is the body to make UN budget
decisions. See UN Charter, art. 17.1.
81. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41.
82. Interview with William Schabas, supra note 17 (“The Security Council
referrals they have done nothing for the ICC . . . just headaches for international
justice. I wish they would repeal article 13(b) from the Statute and . . . if the
Security Council, if they come together and want to prosecute, set up a temporary
tribunal.”); cf. Jennifer Trahan, The Relationship Between the International
Criminal Court and the U.N. Security Council: Parameters and Best Practices, 24
CRIM. L.F. 417, 419 (2013) (noting that the Security Council’s powers derive from
the UN Charter, not the Rome Statute, which only instructs the ICC how to react
should the Security Council make a referral; the Rome Statute does not empower
the Security Council to make referrals).
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e) Increasing Ratifications/Universality
Many interviewees noted the need to increase ratifications of the
Rome Statute in order to maximize the court’s jurisdiction. The ICC
currently has 123 States Parties.83
James Stewart divided states into ones with “democratic values”
that he was optimistic could join the court, and states with “difficult
democratic records” that “may find it more troublesome to come on
board.”84 He stated:
Really, in the end, it’s all about a set of shared values it seems to me. I
think that the rule of law concept that is essential to the International
Criminal Court is a fundamentally democratic value. So, countries that
live by democratic values are going to be interested in that, unless that
have other concerns.85

Stewart saw it as the ASP’s responsibility to increase universality,
and that the ICC could best contribute by “doing a good job.”86
Matthew Gillett similarly opined:
[T]he primary task is to do a good job on the cases that are in front of you,
and hope that through that work the message that is being sent out to
domestic actors is a positive one and there [are] no performance-related
issues that would give them hesitation. And I think that’s the best that can
be done by the international actors.87

David Scheffer explained some of the difficulties with reaching
universality:
It will be difficult for the International Criminal Court to become as
activated and as entrenched as I think it wishes to be as an instrument of
justice if its membership does not expand to some degree significantly
more. . . . What I’m saying is it just has to have two or three more
83. In the fall of 2016, three countries announced their withdrawals from the
Rome Statute—South Africa, Burundi, and The Gambia. However, South Africa
and The Gambia later withdrew their withdrawals, leaving only Burundi’s
withdrawal, which reduced the number of States Parties from 124 to 123. South
Africa has now again announced its intention to withdraw but has not so far
officially done so.
84. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Interview with Matthew Gillet, supra note 15.

2018]

FUTURE OF THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

865

superpowers as part of its membership. I mean the United States, frankly,
China and Russia, no matter how improbable that may seem to us. The
United States may actually be more probable of those three someday. But
without expanding into that field, without expanding into Indonesia, a fair
number or Asian countries whether it be Pakistan or some of the Middle
Eastern countries, Saudi Arabia, etc., it has to have that sort of buy-in I
think for it to be more effective and an institution recognized by some
powerful political actors on the world stage. It would be fortunate,
frankly, if more countries at least adopted the model of the United States
over the past eight years or so under the Obama Administration where
there’s at least a cooperative collaborative relationship even though not
membership status. That would at least move the ball further.88

As to how universality could increase, founding ECCC
International Co-Prosecutor Robert Petit took the view that victims
will push non-ICC States Parties to join the Rome Statute system:
I think humanity as a whole, people always want justice. People want a
fair treatment, a fair shot at having a better life, and certainly having their
victimization recognized and accounted for. The push to bring some of
those countries in line, if you want, will have to come from their own
population. . . . I don’t think the pressure to at least recognize that there
has to be accountability, I don’t think that pressure will let up. It’s part of
the political discourse now. . . . [I]f the ICC has done anything, it’s
certainly that—to make accountability a fact in any conflict. So, I think
there’s a good chance eventually that “outliers,” as you call them, and I
won’t mention any names, will be brought into the fold.89

Richard Goldstone saw the problem of reaching universality as
follows:
I think probably the main reasons keeping India and Pakistan out is the
prospect of war between them. They don’t want to be in situation where
they’ve got to look over their shoulder for the Prosecutor of the ICC in
waging a war where war crimes are inevitably going to be committed. It is
difficult to conceive of a war without war crimes. It’s part of the same
coin. If peace [were] to break out between India and Pakistan than I
wouldn’t put it beyond the realms of possibility. I think it is less likely
with Russia and China because there are autocratic societies where they
want to do what they want to do. And, again, they don’t want people
88. Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48; see Interview with Brenda
Hollis, supra note 24 (noting the difficulty of the US ratifying the Rome Statute).
89. Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23.
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looking at them. The United States is a singular “outlier” because it will
always have its schizophrenia. It is a supporter of international justice for
the whole world and it will even pay for it, but not to include “us.” So,
they have got the same sovereignty and perhaps conceit that most large
nations have of not wanting to be judged, unless it is in their interest.90

Fatou Bensouda noted the importance of increasing ratification in
order to minimize double-standards:
Again, first and foremost, we have to remember that it’s a voluntary act,
voluntary sovereign act to join the ICC and I am pleased there are various
NGOs, the [CICC], [Parliamentarians for Global Action], that everyone is
working towards having universality. And universality is advantageous
for many reasons. Chief amongst them is this perception of doublestandards. It will definitely help to eliminate that. If there are more or as
many countries as possible joining the Rome Statute, we can have
immediate jurisdiction and we can work. It will not be limited because the
State is not a State Party and we cannot come in. So, universality is good
and I think we should continue to work on it together.91

STL Registrar Daryl Mundis had the following recommendations
for increasing Rome Statute membership. First, “the ICC itself needs
to really lead the way and demonstrate it can do the job and it can do
the job professionally, fairly, and without political influence[.]”92
Second, “[w]e need to be doing everything we possibly can to build
democratic reforms within those [rogue] countries. We need to be
changing the political environments within those countries so that the
population within those countries views it as within their interest to
join the court[.]”93 Third, “we need to really do more with respect to
the bigger ‘outliers,’ the US, to convince them that this isn’t a threat
to them, as long as the US court system and particularly the military
justice system continues to function and I think in many ways the US
military criminal justice system is a real, shining example to other
military criminal justice systems.”94
Current ECCC International Co-Prosecutor Nicholas Koumjian
90. Interview with Richard Goldstone, supra note 31.
91. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32.
92. Interview with Daryl Mundis, Registrar, Special Tribunal for Leb., in The
Hague, Neth. (Oct. 5, 2016).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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offered the following observations:
I think it’s quite natural that the number of ratifications has slowed down
because most countries in the world are members of the court. The
remaining countries are often in a situation where you can see a reason
why they are reluctant to join. They are particularly countries that don’t
want to give up their sovereignty over their allegations against their
military, or their political leaders. They will be much harder to convince.
Will international justice ever really be universal? I think that’s a distant
goal, but it will depend on the court establishing its own legitimacy, the
fairness of the process, the good judgments of the prosecution and what
cases to bring and whatever happens that makes people realize that they
have to sacrifice sovereignty in order to get this international justice.
Because there is no question about it, when you join an international court
like that, like in any treaty, a country makes promises. It’s giving up part
of its sovereignty by committing to the obligations of the treaty. And
that’s of course going to be the case in the International Criminal Court.
In the International Criminal Court, you expose your soldiers, your
generals, your president to potential criminal prosecution.95

Nicholas Koumjian noted the potential for exposure of US
nationals before the ICC but was hopeful that if the ICC proves its
objectivity and “ability to deal real justice,” that the US will someday
join. He stated:
I’m in favor of international justice. I think the United States is in a
position that’s different from any other country. I don’t think that people
recognize that. You know, when Syria conflicts are happening in Syria, or
when chemical weapons are being used in Syria, people are not saying:
Where’s Indonesia? Where’s Belgium? They are saying: Where’s the
United States? Why hasn’t the United States reacted? American military
is involved, and States are calling for military involvement in many
conflicts around the world. So, I think . . . you can understand the reasons
for reluctance. Again, I think if the court proves its objectivity and its
ability to deal real justice, given the principle of complementarity of
willingness of US courts to try crimes by American soldiers, I would hope
that someday the United States would join.96

David Crane took a more pessimistic view: “The US will never
join the ICC. Not in my lifetime. . . . I just don’t think there’s enough
95. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, Int’l Co-Prosecutor, Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in Nuremberg, Ger. (Sept. 29, 2016).
96. Id.
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political will in this country to have us join. I think we’re going the
other way. . . . [W]e’re going inward not outward.”97 As to other
countries, he emphasized the importance of showing a successful
ICC, and suggested if the ICC did more domestic capacity-building it
could help incentivize “outliers,” that they would benefit by joining
the court.98
Gregory Townsend suggested that when getting votes for “signing
up for the rule of law” is more attractive than saying “you’ll stand up
the international community,” then countries like Russia, the US,
India, Pakistan, and China will join.99 He also spoke of the US’s
leading role with the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
and the hope that the US will “come again full circle” and join the
ICC, and that could prove a catalyst to other ratifications:
[It] having just been the 70th anniversary of Nuremberg, the thought that
comes to my mind is how proud Justice Jackson was and how the US
really took hold of what was count 1 of [crimes again peace] and how that
really is the same crime as aggression today and how the US was the flagbearer for that offense and how our position has turned 180 degrees [over
the] last seventy years. And so, I would like to think that we would come
again full circle back to that position where the US is viewed as a source
of legal pride and that we are there and that once the US signs on, others
will perhaps feel more political pressure to join in. I think the other states
are less likely to join as long as the US stays out and so a role model
needs to happen first and I think we just have to come to terms with the
court, come to terms with the crime of aggression, embrace it again and
perhaps there will be a watershed. Now, will that happen in twenty-totwenty-five years? That remains to be seen, but I’d like to think there are
people out there that are doing the cost/benefit thinking that this is really
the kind of world we’d like to live in.100

Hassan Jallow spoke optimistically that perhaps “outliers” could
be embarrassed into joining: “I hope the process of justice will be so
overwhelming worldwide that, you know, states would be
embarrassed not to be part of it. Then they might join.”101
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Interview with David Crane, supra note 3.
Id.
Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15.
Id.
Interview with Hassan Jallow, supra note 3.
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Carsten Stahn noted that “outliers” were already engaged with the
ICC through the UN system,102 and that states might increasingly
utilize Rome Statute crimes without necessarily joining the ICC.103
Professor William Schabas looked optimistically at the ability of
the ICC to examine the conduct of US, UK, and Russian nationals
through Investigations and Preliminary Examinations now before the
ICC.104
f) Adding Crimes to the ICC’s Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The issue of adding crimes to the Rome Statute (beyond the crime
of aggression),105 did not arise much in interviews—although there
are pending proposals before the ICC’s Working Group on
Amendments, some of which would add crimes to the ICC’s
jurisdiction.106
As to adding more crimes to the Rome Statute, Renan Villacis
explained:
I think in an ideal world there are many who would like the idea of the
ICC to cover also other types of crimes. As you know, we have had
discussions with other States Parties on expanding [the Rome Statute] to
102. Interview with Carsten Stahn, supra note 22 (“I think many of [the outliers]
are already a part of the system obviously through the link to the United Nations
network and the collaboration between the ICC particularly and the UN system I
think will remain crucial. . . . We see . . . the ICC as a system of justice . . . as it
gets greater importance in the UN system. I think, that might be the vehicle . . . to
promote change and to convince some of the existing ‘outliers’ to move even
closer to the existing system than it exists right now.”).
103. Id. (“I think that increasingly domestic institutions will take on and build
on cases which have been done internationally and that again might create
basically an environment in which the national system[,] although it might not be
formally part of a treaty, actually already applies much of the essence of it.”).
104. Interview with William Schabas, supra note 17.
105. See Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5, Activation of the Jurisdiction of the
Court Over the Crime of Aggression, Dec. 14, 2017, https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP16/ICC-ASP-16-Res5-ENG.pdf.
106. Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties, Informal Compilation of
Proposals to Amend the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2015), https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Publications/WGA-Inf-Comp-RS-amendments-ENG.pdf;
see also Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.4, Resolution on Amendments to Article 8 of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Dec. 14, 2017,
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP16/ICC-ASP-16-Res4ENG.pdf (adding three more war crimes to the court’s jurisdiction).
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include, for example, terrorism, drug-trafficking, [use] of nuclear
weapons. Very interesting topics, but politically we haven’t reached
majority support for those options. . . . [I]t really depends on the political
will of the States Parties who are discussing it. It will be a time, five-toten years from now, we may wish to expand [the Rome Statute] to include
either some of the topics already on the table or maybe some new ones—
environmental crimes, something else. It will just depend on the needs I
think of the world community at that stage. . . . If we are struggling to
deliver on our, let’s say, limited mandate now, it would only get more
complicated if we expand it to include other crimes.107

Without saying they should necessarily be added as ICC crimes,
Carsten Stahn hoped that in the future there would be examination of
the “interconnection between crimes and structural violence,”
particularly the
“nexus between international crimes and
transnational crimes,” as well as accountability for business leaders,
and the “financial streams” behind some of the crimes.108 He opined:
“Some of this could be under the existing framework of the ICC, but
for instance, imagine a transnational crimes chamber of the ICC.
That would be, I think, a very interesting development of the existing
practice and jurisprudence, which might allow the ICC to even
operate more effectively in some of its situations.”109
g) Serving as a Model of “Best Practices”
Some noted that the ICC of the future would ideally serve as a
model of “best practices.” Thus, David Crane stated: “I think the ICC
needs to be . . . a center of excellence of taking on the gravest of
crimes when States Parties are . . . unwilling or unable[.]”110 Deputy
Prosecutor James Stewart opined: “[T]he ICC . . . I think [is] a kind
of inspiration as the standard bearer, the standard setter if you
will.”111
3. Skeptics of Scenario #1
Skeptics of the ICC—or the ICC as the main “international
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Interview with Renan Villacis, supra note 45.
Interview with Carsten Stahn, supra note 22.
Id.
Interview with David Crane, supra note 3.
Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41.
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justice” institution of the future— made several arguments,
including: (a) its limited capacity; (b) its high cost; (c) it not being
designed to prosecute large numbers of individuals from any one
situation country, such as the crimes in Syria; (d) world powers not
ratifying the Rome Statute; and (e) “push-back” and non-cooperation
hampering the court’s work. One interviewee noted there might also
be implosion of the ICC, or retreat from the field of international
justice.
a) Capacity
Several interviewees took the view that the ICC cannot possibly
handle all high-level genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity prosecutions of the future as it only prosecutes a few
individuals from each situation country and, therefore, there still will
be a need for additional hybrid tribunals.
Thus, Robert Petit took the view that the ICC will be the “gold
standard,” but cannot conduct all the prosecutions:
I don’t think the ICC can ever be the dominant institution. . . . Its
processes . . . are too cumbersome . . . to be able to respond adequately to
all issues, and I don’t think it’s meant to. To me, I see the ICC first and
foremost as a moral statement by the international community. Yes, there
will be accountable for mass crimes. There will be something there
regardless of who wins, regardless of your stature or your official
position. This is a commitment that we’re making. And, obviously also
the ICC . . . is the gold standard in terms of the interpretation of the
law. So, it’s there as a guiding light. It’s also there as a gatekeeper, as a
promise that, as I said, after a certain level, there will be no
immunity. But, it . . . cannot be the answer, or at least the allencompassing answer.112

Former US War Crimes Ambassador and Head of the Office of
Global Criminal Justice, Stephen Rapp took a similar view:
I think the approach of a high-level court in The Hague conducting
proceeding in a very slow and expensive way doesn’t get you very much
quantity of justice. It may get you some quality. It may get you some
jurisprudence. The idea that it will radically change in the next twenty
years and be able to say produce a dozen judgments a year or something
112. Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23.
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like that, or have anything like the ICTY’s numbers in less than half a
century or something like that, is, I think, unrealistic, given where it’s
been[.]113

Serge Brammertz opined similarly that the ICC “will never be the
solution for all atrocities.”114
b) Cost of the ICC
One reason cited as to why the ICC would not be the dominant
institute of the future was “cost” as a factor limiting its capacity.115
James Stewart responded to the cost criticism of the ICC as
follows:
[I]nternational criminal justice is expensive. You’re not making widgets.
You can’t really make these calculations. I think our responsibility is to
use the resources that we are given in the most efficient and the most
effective way that we can. And whatever may have been the case in the
past, certainly from what I’ve seen since I arrived, there is a genuine
effort amongst all the principles in the court. I’m talking about the
Prosecutor, the Registrar, and the President, and the people in the
different organs in the court. . . . I think the buzzword these days is
“synergies.” So that we avoid duplication in the purchase and use of
resources. We make very careful calculations as to how we are going to
apply our resources, but it is expensive.116

He continued by explaining how the complexity of cases and
security of interviewees in situation countries both contribute to
increased costs:
[W]here you have very difficult security situations, you have kind of
rolling missions. People are in and out [of the situation country] and
that’s expensive. The fact that we have to take such care in how we
approach people who deal with us to protect them against reprisal, again
creates expensive situations. We can’t always go and talk to people; we
sometimes have to bring them out. All of this costs money. There’s just
no cheap way of putting these cases together. They are complex, difficult
cases. . . . You really have to put your case together if you’re going to
113. Interview with Stephen Rapp, supra note 73.
114. Interview with Serge Brammertz, supra note 68.
115. See also supra Section 1.2(a) (Increasing Effectiveness and Efficiency
(Responding to Cost Criticisms)).
116. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41.
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accuse someone of these dreadful crimes, and be in a position to prove it,
and it’s not cheap to do that.117

c) Inability to Prosecute Large Numbers of Individuals from Any One
Situation/ Crimes as Vast as Those Occurring in Syria
When specifically asked about the crimes occurring in Syria,
many interviewees opined that the ICC could not address the number
of high-level prosecutions that would be needed if full jurisdiction
over the situation in Syria is ever attained, and that, therefore, a
freestanding Syria tribunal, according to some, would be a preferable
option.
David Scheffer envisioned that a multilateral hybrid tribunal for
Syria could be created by agreement of a number of states in the
region and the UN General Assembly.118 Stephen Rapp predicted that
justice for crimes in Syria would come in the form of a hybrid
tribunal or Syrian domestic trials.119 Gregory Townsend also
endorsed the ad hoc model to handle the number of crimes being
committed in Syria.120 On the other hand, David Scheffer also stated:
“I would prefer the heavy diplomatic lift being the Security Council
referring the situation to the International Criminal Court because the
capacity is certainly within the ICC to take this on.”121
While Serge Brammertz endorsed a hybrid “regional solution,” he
noted “the problem will be to find . . . the people in the region who
are able and willing to do it, [and] perceived as independent and
impartial enough.”122
Daryl Mundis did not envision the ICC having the institutional
capacity to prosecute the crimes occurring in Syria:
117. Id.
118. Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48.
119. Interview with Stephen Rapp, supra note 73.
120. Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15.
121. Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48 (opining how a Syria hybrid
tribunal might work in complement to the ICC: “[M]aybe we could build a hybrid
tribunal that has built into its statute that if there can be a referral to the ICC in the
future, then the work of that special tribunal could be somehow transferred to the
jurisdiction of the ICC”); see also Interview with David Crane, supra note 3 (“[A
hybrid] can be used as an alternative in complement to the ICC.”).
122. Interview with Serge Brammertz, supra note 68.
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Do I think the ICC can do it? I’m afraid not given the current resource
limitations. So that takes us back to question [one]. How do we deal with
that? How do we address that? In an ideal world, perhaps that situation
might be dealt with by the ICC, but given the large number of additional
situations they have going on right now, I simply don’t see it possible to
do that, unless you’re prepared to double the size of that institution which
I don’t think the ASP is prepared to do.123

Serge Brammertz opined similarly:
[T]he ICC will never be able to bring a comprehensive . . . solution to the
conflict in Syria. If you look at the ICTY, you know, for a war which was
shorter than the war already in Syria, where the number of victims is less
than 50% of the number of victims in Syria, an entire tribunal was created
with 161 persons indicted, with 4,000 cases ongoing in Bosnia alone. So,
to think that the ICC alone would be able to resolve the situation, I don’t
think this will be the case. The ICC will be there and will become even
more important, and we have to be supportive, [but] the ICC has to be the
tribunal of last resort.124

Nicholas Koumjian also expressed the view that the ICC cannot
handle Syria prosecutions:
I would imagine, Syria is going to be a situation where most people are
going to want a lot of people prosecuted. And, the ICC, by its nature, is
going to be an institution that probably isn’t fit to try a lot of people from
one situation. I think that’s one of the reasons that there is a . . . likelihood
in the future of other ad hoc tribunals, or other hybrid tribunals, because
they will be targeting a greater number of perpetrators than the ICC could
handle.125

Nicholas Koumjian also predicted there could be a domestic,
regional, or mixed tribunal for Syria:
[I]n a country like Syria, a super complex conflict like that, I frankly
would doubt that that case will go to the ICC ever. It could. I mean it
could be a Security Council referral or a government could come to power
that would accept retroactively jurisdiction. But I think probably there is
going to be great domestic desire to keep that either domestic or regional,
or some amount of sovereignty over the process. It could be a mixed
123. Interview with Daryl Mundis, supra note 92.
124. Interview with Serge Brammertz, supra note 68.
125. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
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tribunal. I’m not saying anything like this is likely to happen any time
soon, but since I’m doing a case that’s over forty years old, I think one of
the things you have to recognize is that the current situation can change.
That conflict will end, we hope, certainly, someday. I’m sure there will be
calls for some mechanism of justice and most likely some mechanism of
justice will emerge.126

On the other hand, in terms of the ICC’s capacity, James Stewart
pointed out that the ICC can do what it is funded to do—that States
Parties could provide the funding for the ICC to prosecute more than
a handful of individuals in each situation country.127 Renan Villacis
opined that if the ICC were to receive a referral of the Syria situation,
it would require “a substantial investment of resources.”128
d) World Powers Remaining Outside the Rome Statute System
As to achieving universal ratification of the Rome Statute, some
expressed the view that the US, Russia, and China (each permanent
members of the UN Security Council) would remain permanently
outside the Rome Statute system, and, thus, the ICC will never attain
its goal of universality.129 Because the Security Council has power
both to refer and to defer ICC cases,130 the lack of ratification by
these three permanent members (who hold veto power over referral
decisions) is often seen as particularly problematic.131
Stephen Rapp noted: “Ratifications have clearly slowed down in
the last half decade, and I don’t envision very much progress on that
front. . . . [Y]ou’ve got the classic problem where a lot of the bad
things that happen in the world will happen in countries or places
that are outside the legal reach of the ICC and it’s hard to imagine
that gap filling soon[.]”132
126. Id.
127. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41; see also Interview of David
Scheffer, supra note 48 (“It’s not beyond the pale for the ICC to have a larger
number of targets of opportunity.”).
128. Interview with Renan Villacis, supra note 45.
129. See supra Section 1.2(e) (Increasing Ratifications/Universality).
130. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 4, arts. 13, 16.
131. Interview with Zimbabwean Attorney, in The Hague, Neth. (Nov. 21,
2016).
132. Interview with Stephen Rapp, supra note 73.
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Judge Agius also noted the problem:
As long as you have the United States, for example, Russia, China, India,
not to mention some other countries not willing to become State Parties of
the ICC, you have a problem. And you have a problem in more ways than
one because these countries, particularly Russia, United States, and China
are amongst the permanent five in the Security Council. And you have to
be realistic. Living in a fool’s paradise and hoping and hoping and hoping
doesn’t help you much. You have to be realistic. So, these countries count
and count a lot even though they are not State Parties of the ICC.133

He also noted that the absence of the permanent members of the
UN Security Council had an impact on the ICC’s budget in terms of
the lack of their financial contributions.134
e) “Push-Back”/Non-Cooperation
As noted above, certain cases have unleashed significant “push
back” to the court’s work—particularly the issuance of ICC warrants
against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir135 and the investigation of
the individuals who became Kenya’s President (Uhuru Kenyatta),
and Deputy President (William Ruto).136
After the ICC’s first warrant against al Bashir, the argument was
made that the warrant endangered international peace and security
and the African Union (AU) asked the UN Security Council to defer
the warrant.137 Similarly, Kenya and the AU requested the Security
Council to defer proceedings against Kenya’s President and Deputy
President regarding post-election violence in 2007–2008 in which
over 1,000 persons were killed.138 The Security Council did not agree
133. Interview with Carmel Agius, supra note 33.
134. Id.
135. See Prosecutor v. Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest; Prosecutor v. Bashir, ICC-02/0501/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest.
136. Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11 (charges
withdrawn); Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC01/09-01/11 (charges vacated). The warrants were issued prior to Kenyatta and
Ruto being elected.
137. Xan Rice & Tania Branigan, Sudanese President Expels Aid Agencies,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
5,
2009,
4:50
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/05/sudan-aid-agencies-expelled.
138. Michelle Nichols, African Leaders Ask U.N. to Defer Kenya International
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to either deferral. Thereafter, the AU has taken various aggressive
positions vis-à-vis the ICC including insisting on a Rome Statute
amendment that a sitting head of state should be immune from
prosecution,139 a position with which most ICC States Parties do not
agree. There have also been calls by the AU for African States
Parties to withdraw from the Rome Statute, and, individual African
states, such as Uganda, Kenya, and Namibia, have also periodically
suggested they could withdraw.140 As noted above, in Fall 2016,
South Africa, Burundi, and The Gambia, did withdraw from the
Rome Statute, with South Africa and The Gambia later withdrawing
their withdrawals.141 After extensive witness intimidation and noncooperation in producing evidence, the Ruto and Kenyatta cases
eventually collapsed.142 All of the ICC’s warrants as to Sudanese
officials for crimes committed in Darfur remain outstanding.
It is possible that future ICC cases could similarly engender
“push-back.” As James Stewart noted, “[w]e are probably down the
road inevitably getting into tougher and tougher situations.”143 Fatou
Bensouda similarly explained:
The very nature of what we do, the ICC, investigating and prosecuting
these crimes and holding people who normally would not be held
Criminal Trials, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/uskenya-icc-un-idUSBRE99L14O20131022.
139. Dapo Akande, An International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the
ICC Head of State Immunity Issue, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L (Mar. 31, 2016),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/an-international-court-of-justice-advisory-opinion-on-theicc-head-of-state-immunity-issue.
140. See Luckystar Miyandazi, Philomena Apiko & Faten Aggad-Clerx, Why an
African Mass Withdrawal from the ICC is Possible, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 2, 2016,
6:11 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/icc-international-criminal-court-africagambia-south-africa-burundi-515870.
141. Manisuli Ssenyonjo, State Withdrawal Notifications From the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court: South Africa, Burundi and the Gambia, CRIM.
L.F. (2017), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10609-017-9321z.pdf.
142. Thomas Escritt, ICC Judges Agree to Withdrawal of Kenyatta Charges,
REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2015, 11:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-iccidUSKBN0M91SH20150313; Marlise Simons & Jeffrey Gettleman, International
Criminal Court Drops Case Against Kenya’s William Ruto, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/africa/william-ruto-kenyaicc.html.
143. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41.
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accountable, holding them accountable. There will definitely be pushback. It is for sure that there will be push-back against the institution
because [certain countries] don’t want this scrutiny.144

Of the situations currently under Investigation and Preliminary
Examination, certain ones can be anticipated to draw potentially
hostile reactions from particular non-States Parties: The preliminary
examination involving crimes committed in Palestine (potentially
involving Israeli nationals);145 the preliminary examination involving
crimes committed in Afghanistan (potentially involving, among
others, US nationals);146 the preliminary examination involving
crimes committed in Ukraine (potentially involving Russian
nationals);147 and the investigation into crimes committed in Georgia
(also potentially involving Russian nationals).148
Russia’s recent purported “unsigning” of the Rome Statute149 is
not a “withdrawal” (as misleadingly reported in the media),150 and
therefore not very significant as a legal matter, as signing only
commits a state not to defeat the “object and purpose” of the
Statute.151 Yet, Russia’s announcement also suggests that one can
144. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32.
145. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Issues Her Annual Report on Preliminary
Examination Activities (2016), (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.icccpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1252.
146. Id. The Prosecutor has filed a request for authorization that the
Afghanistan Preliminary Examination move to the Investigation stage. See OTP,
Situation In The Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan, Nov. 20, 2017,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_06891.PDF.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Shaun Walker & Owen Bowcott, Russia Withdraws Signature from
International Criminal Court Statute, GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2016, 9:14 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/16/russia-withdraws-signaturefrom-international-criminal-court-statute. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties does not provide that treaties may be “unsigned.” See Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 336 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
150. Robbie Gramer, Why Russia Just Withdrew from The ICC, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Nov. 16, 2016, 10:18 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/why-russia-justwithdrew-from-icc-putin-treaty-ukraine-law/.
151. See VCLT, supra note 149, art. 18 (“A State is obliged to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when . . . it has signed the
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anticipate non-cooperation from Russia should the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) proceed with the preliminary examination of
crimes in Ukraine or investigation of crimes in Georgia.
The prospect that Rome Statute crimes may be occurring in the
Philippines—something noted by the ICC Prosecutor152—has also
raised the possibility of a Philippine withdrawal from the Rome
Statute, particularly if the OTP focuses additional attention on those
crimes.153
The initial withdrawals of Gambia and Burundi, and implied threat
of withdrawal of the Philippines do raise the troubling question of
whether States in the future will simply withdraw from the Rome
Statute if they anticipate potential criminal exposure to state actors.
The Rome Statute somewhat softens the impact in that withdrawal
takes one year to be effective, with ICC jurisdiction continuing
during that year, and cooperation obligations extending beyond that
year as to any criminal investigations or proceedings already
commenced.154
James Stewart spoke of the importance of the ICC formally
examining “lessons learned” from the Kenya situation in order to
adjust its practices:
We already suffered some setbacks that everybody knows about. I’m
treaty[.]”); see also Walker & Bowcott, supra note 149 (“Russia’s decision to
‘withdraw’ its signature from the Rome Statute will have little or no impact on the
court. Contrary to the government’s statement, Russia has never engaged with the
court in any meaningful way.”).
152. ICC Prosecutor Warns Philippine Authorities over Drug War Killings,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/icc-prosecutor-warnsphilippine-authorities-over-drug-war-killings/a-36036960.
153. International Criminal Court, Press Release ICC-CPI-20180320-PR1371,
“ICC Statement on The Philippines’ notice of withdrawal: State participation in
Rome Statute system essential to international rule of law,” March 20, 2018, at
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1371.
154. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 4, art. 127
(“A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect
one year after the date of receipt of the notification . . . . Its withdrawal shall not
affect any cooperation with the [c]ourt in connection with criminal investigations
and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate
and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became
effective[.]”).
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thinking particularly of the Kenya situation, which has been very difficult
and we need to learn from those experiences.
I think we . . . in fact have learned from the Kenya situation. What we
would like to do is a more formal examination[,] if I could put it that
way[,] of how we handled the Kenya situation given the stakes, given the
failure of justice if you will, that we never want to repeat. Each
situation[,] however[,] is unique. You won’t necessarily be able to draw
some sort of formula from Kenya. We see certain things working in
certain situations. You sometimes think to yourself, at a particular time—
might that have worked in Kenya? We don’t know. We’ll have to see.155

For example, James Stewart spoke of moving away from solely
relying on witness evidence:
So now, for example, you don’t find us relying solely on witness
evidence. It’s always going to be the core of our cases. You can’t get
away from that. But we try to layer our evidence, to find all sorts of other
evidence from open source materials that’s there on the internet to
forensic examinations of crime sites and that sort of thing, documentary
evidence, whatever we can get to support the eye-witness accounts and to
provide a level of comfort to the Trial Chamber particularly, that we are
able to established the facts that we allege. So, it’s a more sophisticated
approach to investigations.156

Matthew Gillett mentioned the need to ensure that ICC case are
strong,157 and to enhance witness protection.158
Stephen Rapp noted the difficulty of the ICC receiving
cooperation even from States Parties when it comes to investigating
state actors, noting it is “almost impossible to investigate anyone
155. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41.
156. Id.
157. Interview with Matthew Gillet, supra note 15 (“[T]he managers and the
strategists at the ICC need to be sure that they are picking cases particularly that
are well-supported by the evidence, that are ready to go to trial when they get put
to that stage of proceedings, and so that you don’t end up with a situation where a
trial falls apart halfway through.”).
158. Id. (“I think that [witness protection] is a considerable challenge for the
[ICC] because they simply don’t have the personnel to be present monitoring
security in any kind of comprehensive way in most of the situation locations. So,
they are going to have to really enhance their strategy and find partners, states,
other organizations that are able to help them secure witnesses and their families,
and enable them to actually deliver their evidence to the court.”).
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allied with the powers that be.”159
When asked how the ICC could be strengthened against political
interference in its work, Hassan Jallow suggested increasing the
Prosecutor’s powers of initiating investigations on her own (proprio
motu).160
f) Implosion of the ICC (Or the Field of International Justice)
The most skeptical voice noted that the author could have included
a “Scenario 4,” in which the ICC collapses, and a “Scenario 5,”
pursuant to which there is a massive retreat from the international
community’s commitment to the field of international justice.161
These possibilities are discussed further below, with most
interviewees rejecting such pessimistic views.162

II. SCENARIO #2: ADDITIONAL TRIBUNALS AS
THE DOMINANT APPROACH OF THE FUTURE
This was the second scenario presented to interviewees:
In the second scenario, the international community continues to
create a number of additional tribunals. These might take the form of
hybrid tribunals (either freestanding new tribunals or ones created
within existing national judicial systems). There might even be future
ad hoc tribunals, with capacities similar to the ICTY and ICTR
although perhaps not created through the UN Security Council. One
or more regional criminal tribunal might also be created. While the
ICC would also exist, it would not be the dominant institution;
rather, it would be one of many institutions. Similarly, national
courts would also continue with some domestic atrocity crimes
prosecutions, although they too would not be the central feature of
the system.163
Interviewees were then asked:
159. Interview with Stephen Rapp, supra note 73.
160. Interview with Hassan Jallow, supra note 3.
161. Interview with David Crane, supra note 3.
162. See infra Part IV.
163. As explained above, none of the scenarios rules out the use of additional
transitional justice tools (over and above prosecutions) nor the exercise of
universal jurisdiction in national courts.
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1. Is Scenario #2 the most likely scenario in twenty years’ time? Why or
why not?
a. Is there a preferred model hybrid tribunal?
2. Is there a potential role for institutions the size of the ad hoc tribunals?
3. Is there a potential role for regional criminal tribunals?

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR SCENARIO #2
As set forth in detail below, various interviewees expressed the
view that Scenario #2 (additional hybrid and other tribunals) is the
most likely scenario in twenty years. In addition to the hybrid
tribunals that have prosecuted, or are prosecuting, crimes committed
in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, Chad, and
Lebanon,164 there is now another hybrid tribunal for Kosovo (the
Kosovo Specialist Chambers),165 work is ongoing to operationalize a
hybrid tribunal in the Central African Republic (the Special Criminal
Court),166 and perhaps to create a hybrid tribunal in South Sudan.167
The potential use of future ad hoc tribunals, or regional criminal
164. They are: The Special Court for Sierra Leone; The Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia; The Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Dili, East
Timor; Regulation 64 Panels in the Courts of Kosovo; the State Court in BosniaHerzegovina; The Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal (which prosecuted
crimes committed in Chad); and The Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
165. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office have
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other crimes under
Kosovo law, and are attached to the court system in Kosovo, but sit in The Hague.
The Chambers and Prosecutor’s Office are being staffed with international judges,
prosecutors, and officers. See Background, KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS &
SPECIALIST
PROSECUTOR’S
OFFICE,
https://www.scp-ks.org/en/specialistchambers/background (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
166. Peter Snyder, Central African Republic Government Establishes Special
Criminal Court, JURIST (Apr. 23, 2015, 10:35 AM), http://www.jurist.org/
paperchase/2015/04/central-african-republic-government-establishes-specialcriminal-court.php (reporting that the Government of CAR has voted to establish a
Special Criminal Court to be staffed by national and international judges).
167. UN Rights Chief Urges Establishment of Hybrid Court for Atrocities in
South Sudan, UN NEWS (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=55801#.WHA4OlzKtf0 (“The United Nations human rights
chief today urged the African Union to quickly establish the hybrid court for South
Sudan to investigate and prosecute those bearing criminal responsibility for the
atrocities.”).
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tribunals (which to date have not been utilized for atrocity crimes
prosecutions), could also fall within this scenario.
Some of the factors cited for supporting the creation of added
hybrid tribunals were: (1) the efficiency of hybrid tribunals; (2) the
successful outreach that is possible; (3) the benefits of locating
hybrid tribunals in their situation countries—which has generally
been the practice;168 (4) the limited capacity of the ICC, suggesting
the need for additional hybrid or other tribunals in situations of largescale atrocity crimes; (5) the ability of hybrid tribunals to better resist
attempts at domestic political control than purely national courts; (6)
the ability of hybrid tribunals (particularly ones located in their
situation country) to contribute to domestic capacity-building, and
allow for more local ownership; and (7) the ability of hybrid
tribunals to demonstrate to local communities rule of law
functioning.
As to the most successful model hybrid tribunal, while various
observations were offered, there was no one dominant model
suggested with some suggesting that the best structure for future
hybrid tribunals—which will necessarily contain features of the
national court system— will be context-specific depending on the
particular national system at issue.
Those skeptical of Scenario #2 were generally supportive of
Scenarios #1 and/or #3, but additional criticisms of hybrid tribunals
were: (1) that they have not been as cost-effective as originally
envisioned; (2) that local ownership could also bring added
difficulties in preserving independence and impartiality; and (3) that
victims have expressed dissatisfaction at the high cost and slow
speed of prosecutions, and the limited number prosecuted.
A few noted the possibility of future use of a regional criminal
tribunal to prosecute atrocity crimes.
As to whether there could be future ad hoc tribunals169 the size of
168. The only current hybrid tribunals not located in their situation countries are
the STL, which sits in The Hague, Netherlands; The Extraordinary African
Chambers, which sat in Senegal, but had jurisdiction over crimes committed in
Chad; and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, which also sits in The Hague.
169. See Interview with William Schabas, supra note 17 (mentioning the caveat
as to calling the ICTY and ICTR the only “ad hoc” tribunals).
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the ICTY or ICTR (although not necessarily created through the UN
Security Council), many interviewees rejected the suggestion,
although some endorsed it for addressing very large-scale crimes.
B. DETAILED FINDINGS OF SCENARIO #2
1. Proponents of Scenario 2 and Rationales
Various interviewees expressed the view that, over the next twenty
years, Scenario #2 was most likely, or at least, that hybrid tribunals
would still exist (along with other mechanisms).
Not surprisingly, three former hybrid tribunal prosecutors were
among those who endorsed Scenario #2 as the dominant approach of
the future—Brenda Hollis,170 David Crane,171 and Robert Petit.172
Serge Brammertz was in favor of hybrid tribunals where domestic
prosecutions are not possible.173
Others endorsed hybrid tribunals where ICC jurisdiction is not
possible, or because they could have greater capacity than the
number of cases the ICC typically brings in a single situation
country.174
Daryl Mundis stated bluntly, “although we keep talking about ‘it’s
the end of all these specialized courts and tribunals,’ we keep
170. See Interview with Brenda Hollis, supra note 24 (“I would suspect we are
more likely to be in scenario number two because there are, and I think for the
foreseeable future will be, States that are not State Parties to the Rome Statue.
And, for political reasons, I think we’re beginning to go back into a world where
perhaps you have an automatic veto, East against West in the Security Council, so
you wouldn’t have [ICC] referrals.”).
171. See Interview with David Crane, supra note 3 (“I think the international
model is a hybrid of some sort, . . . more along the lines of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone.”).
172. See Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23 (“I think there will
always . . . be a need for ad hoc solutions, hybrids, or specific tribunals. Look at
the Specialist Chambers in Kosovo. They’re just coming online 20 years after.
There will always be a need, and personally I’m a big believer in hybrids[.]”).
173. Interview with Serge Brammertz, supra note 68 (“[W]herever [atrocity
crimes prosecutions] are not working at the domestic level for a number of reasons,
[there is] not the capacity or not the political willingness, I am very much in favor
of hybrid or mixed solutions.”).
174. See discussion supra Sections 1.3(a), (c) (“Capacity” and “Inability to
Prosecute Large Numbers of Individuals from Any One Situation/ Crimes as Vast
as those Occurring in Syria” under “Skeptics of Scenario #1”).
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creating them.” 175 He further opined:
The ICC, I don’t think, is in jeopardy of closing down or being overtaken
by other courts and tribunals, but the reality is there are certain limitations
to what any single institution can do before it becomes simply too large to
function, too large to actually be able to meet its specific mandate. And,
of course, there might be future conflicts that don’t fall within the
jurisdiction of the ICC, so I do think that notwithstanding what we’ve
heard about for many, many years, tribunal fatigue, lack of resources
overall, I do see the international community continuing to look at ad hoc
or similar type hybrid situational courts that would fill a perceived gap in
the capacity of the ICC to deal with these types of crimes.176

Nicholas Koumjian, also a hybrid tribunal prosecutor, similarly
opined that in the future there will still be a need for ad hoc or hybrid
tribunals:
I do think it is very likely that [in the future] there are ad hoc or mixed
tribunals. They fill a niche that they think the ICC can’t fill and that
domestic courts in some instances can’t fill because either the state does
not have the capacity (either the will or the capacity) to do the cases in the
way that will have the confidence of the victims or of the international
community, or because it is seen that any domestic prosecution will be too
biased.177

Gregory Townsend stated that whether there are more hybrid
tribunals depends on whether conflicts of the future are committed in
ICC situation counties or not.178 Fatou Bensouda also shared this
view: “I will not discount having more hybrid courts created by the
UN. I think this is also a scenario we can look at because
increasingly what we see happening is that a conflict erupts maybe in
a state that is not party to the Rome Statute.”179
a) Efficiency of Hybrid Tribunals
Some noted the relative efficiency of hybrid tribunals compared
with ad hoc tribunals or the ICC. Thus, Brenda Hollis opined: “I
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Interview with Daryl Mundis, supra note 92.
Id.
Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15.
Interview with Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32.
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think if we do have these hybrids they may produce a lot more
concrete results a lot more quickly and a lot more efficiently than the
ICC.”180 Similarly, David Crane stated, “I’m not holding this up to be
the model. What I’m saying is that we’ve shown the hybrid
international war crimes tribunal can be an efficient model[.]”181
b) Successful Outreach of Hybrid Tribunals
Some also noted the successful outreach of at least one hybrid
tribunal—the Special Court for Sierra Leone—as a model to
follow182—with outreach facilitated by locating most hybrid tribunals
directly in their situation countries.183
The successful work of the Special Court was also noted in terms
of prosecuting all sides in the conflict.184
David Crane also provided an important reminder that
accountability is not for its own sake, but for the victims:
It’s about the victims. How can we effectively account for them, get
justice for them? And that’s what we’re missing. We’re starting to miss
the point. We don’t create courts for accountability, whatever that looks
like—domestic courts, regional, international, or . . . the ICC. We have to
ask ourselves: is this what needs to be done for the victims? And we may
be surprised. . . . You’re talking to the victims, you’re listening to the
victims, you’re investigating, you may be able to have a town hall
program, a dialogue with the victims. They need to understand what’s
going on, why it’s going on this way.185

Commenting on the ICTY’s outreach program, by contrast, Serge
Brammertz admitted that the ICTY could have used more emphasis
on outreach but blamed the real difficulties on political leadership in
180. Interview with Brenda Hollis, supra note 24.
181. Interview with David Crane, supra note 3.
182. E.g., Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23 (“Sierra Leone, in terms of
its outreach, establishes quite a good standard, recognizing the importance of
outreach.”).
183. See supra note 168.
184. Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23 (“On the other hand, [in] Sierra
Leone, we went after both sides of the conflict, and much to the credit, I think, of
the Prosecutor and the institution itself.”).
185. Interview with David Crane, supra note 3 (also emphasizing speaking with
politicians and diplomats to explain a court’s work to minimize “pushback”).
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parts of the former Yugoslavia:
I would not have imagined that it would be so difficult. And if I’m asked:
[W]hat if you would have to start again twenty years ago? What would be
different? I would say even more emphasis on outreach. . . . [P]erhaps we
have not been good enough in explaining what we are doing, more
specifically to the perpetrators’ communities, but it is a fact that as long as
the new political leadership has not the courage to accept that there were
wrongdoings by the predecessors in the past, as long as you don’t have
this attitude by the political leadership, it is very, very difficult to
convince people. We see this every day with the hate speech which is still
very, very present, with the denial of the genocide in Srebrenica, or denial
of crimes in general where today some parts, like Republika Srpska or
others, are calling experts to rewrite the history of the conflict and to
rewrite expert reports on cases on which we have already a final judgment
in The Hague. So, there is for sure place for a mea culpa at the Tribunal to
explain better, but I think the major problem is that many politicians in
the former Yugoslavia are still very nationalistic in their approach and are
still thinking that by dividing, they have more chances to be reelected than
by moving together towards a common future, and this is extremely
disappointing. This is, I would say, now nine years in the office, the most
disappointing to see—a number of members in the political leadership
having this kind of destructive attitude where it should be the opposite.186

c) Contributions to Capacity-Building and Local Ownership
Another noted benefit of hybrid tribunals is that they allow
national staff to work alongside experienced internationals at all
levels, which may increase the capacity of local staff when they
return to their domestic institutions.
Thus, Robert Petit stressed that hybrids can ensure a standard of
justice and help with capacity-building.187 Hassan Jallow similarly
opined:
[M]any countries now, situation countries, would like . . . [to] see a
process of reconstruction of the national legal system . . . as a part of that
process. . . . And that means, of course, hybrids. It is easier done [with]
186. Interview with Serge Brammertz, supra note 68.
187. Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23 (“The importance of hybrids is
that it allows, by having internationals involved, at least theoretically, a certain
standard of justice, and it allows [taking] the pressure off of the nationals who
participated in it. The hard decisions can be made, and hopefully some capacitybuilding.”).
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the hybrid structure than [with] the ad hoc. . . . I think that we need, also,
to pay attention to the potential role of international justice in
reconstructing the national system, enhancing its capacity, etc., and the
hybrids have an advantage in that particular area.188

Serge Brammertz stressed that hybrid tribunals can allow for local
ownership: “I am very much in favor of hybrid or mixed solutions if
possible with local ownership, because, as I said, you can resolve the
problem of distance by having a hybrid, a mixed solution, where you
have local ownership with international support[.]”189
By contrast, Carsten Stahn noted that when hybrids are “fully
transplanted” from the local context,190 it might be difficult to create
the normal acceptance and “spillover effect on the domestic
system.”191 He stated: “I remain a little bit skeptical [whether] the
fully transplanted [institution] actually gets the degree of acceptance
and the kind of . . . domestic reception that we might expect and can
create the kind of spillover effect on the domestic system that we
would normally see in other scenarios.”192
d) Too Many Atrocity Crimes Not to Have Additional Hybrid
Tribunals
Others expressed the view that because the ICC has limited
capacity to address crimes in any single situation country, and with
atrocity crimes still occurring in large volume, the ICC cannot handle
all the atrocity crimes prosecutions of the future.193
Thus, for instance, David Scheffer stated: “If you look at the world
today, you have to conclude that the worth and the value of hybrid
tribunals must be available . . . because we have too many situations
in the world which the International Criminal Court is simply not
addressing today and may not in the future.”194
188. Interview with Hassan Jallow, supra note 3.
189. Interview with Serge Brammertz, supra note 68.
190. Three hybrid tribunals have not been located in their situation countries.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
191. Interview with Carsten Stahn, supra note 22.
192. Id.
193. See discussion supra Section 1.3(a) (criticism of the ICC as not the
dominant model of the future due to limited capacity).
194. Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48.
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e) Hybrids Better at Resisting Political Pressure than Purely
Domestic Institutions, Adding Neutrality and Objectivity
Stephen Rapp opined that hybrid tribunals can prove stronger at
resisting domestic political control than purely domestic institutions:
“[T]he right internationals can bring something you don’t get in a
purely national system” because of the difficulty of the purely
national approach being able to exercise “political control.” He
explained that this was “why I don’t go all the way to . . . [Scenario]
number 3.”195
Nicholas Koumjian similarly noted that one of the benefits of
hybrid tribunals is that international judges can add “a layer of
neutrality, of objectivity”:
I think one of [the State Court in Bosnia’s] early successes was that the
participation of international judges gave another little layer or added a
layer of neutrality, of objectivity and probably a greater acceptance of the
legitimacy of the verdicts of that court when any judge is going to be
automatically seen as biased to whatever his ethnicity is, whether that’s
true or not.196

Yet, Koumjian also cautioned: “What you certainly don’t want is
international involvement simply putting a veneer of legitimacy over
an illegitimate process. . . . [T]hat’s part of the negotiations and the
process to ensure that the involvement is real and that the process has
a good prospect of a just result and produced transparently.”197
The experience of the ECCC—which suffered from extensive
attempts by the Executive in Cambodia to manipulate the tribunal’s
work198—suggests that not all hybrid tribunals are exempt from
political pressure, particularly ones located in their situation country.
However, they may still be in a better position to attempt to resist
such political pressure than a purely domestic institution.
195. Interview with Stephen Rapp, supra note 73.
196. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
197. Id.
198. See generally HEATHER RYAN & LAURA MCGREW, PERFORMANCE AND
PERCEPTION: THE IMPACT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF
CAMBODIA
27
(Kelly
Askin
&
David
Berry
eds.,
2016),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/performanceperception-eccc-20160211.pdf.
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Former Sierra Leone Special Court Registrar and Registrar of the
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone Bintah Mansaray opined
that we will still have hybrid tribunals because sometimes domestic
courts do not have the legal authority to prosecute:
[W]e would still [in the future] be seeing hybrid courts, in my view for
political reasons because sometimes domestic courts . . . would not have
the legal basis to prosecute atrocity crimes. In our case in Sierra Leone,
the government gave blanket amnesty to all fighters. Therefore, even if
the government is willing and able to prosecute people for crimes
committed during the war, the government wouldn’t be in a position to do
so. . . .199

f) Demonstrating Rule of Law at Work
Nicholas Koumjian opined that hybrid tribunals, such as the
ECCC, can also demonstrate to the local population that “justice is
possible”—cases can be decided based on “evidence and the rule of
law” and not “who has the most money or power.” He stated:
[W]hen a court tries cases about the horrible crimes that happened in
Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge time, or the horrible civil wars in
Sierra Leone, the fact that those trials are going on in a transparent
process, with the evidence, with the law applied, this raises the
expectations of people in the country. The students that come to watch,
the ordinary people that observe it, the lawyers and judges in the country
[who] see this process go on. . . . I think it has a benefit of raising
expectations that this kind of justice is possible. Cases can be decided not
based on who has the most money or power, but based upon evidence and
rule of the law. I think there is a very subtle but very, very important
benefit of international justice in these countries.200

2. What Form of Hybrid Tribunal is the Model for the Future?
Interviewees who advocated for Scenario 2 (particularly hybrid
tribunals) were asked what form of hybrid tribunal would be
preferable. For instance, one model is to create a new, freestanding
institution, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which, while
created by agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra
199. Interview with Bintah Mansaray, Registrar Residual Special Court for
Sierra Leone, in Nuremberg, Ger. (Sept. 30, 2016).
200. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
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Leone,201 was not created within Sierra Leone’s existing judicial
system.
Another model is to build a hybrid chamber within an existing
domestic court system, as was done with the ECCC,202 although
several interviewees were quick to note that the precise experience
relating to the ECCC—which has been plagued by serious problems
of lack of judicial independence from the Cambodian government—
should not be replicated.203
Views here were split, and some suggested that models for hybrid
tribunals need to be context- specific, so that no one precise model
should be selected as the dominant method, as it will depend on the
existing conditions of the national court system at issue. Daryl
Mundis noted that what is created may depend in part on what the
national authorities want,204 and whether the country at issue has a
common or civil law background.205
A strong view was also expressed that voluntary contributions are
not an appropriate method to fund future hybrid tribunals.206
a) Freestanding Hybrid Model
Some, such as Brenda Hollis, supported a freestanding model of a
hybrid tribunal: “I think it would be situational but I do favor a
hybrid that is the product of an agreement between the United
Nations and the state, instead of an internationalized specialized unit
201. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 10, Jan. 16,
2002, 2178 U.N.T.S 137.
202. RYAN & MCGREW, supra note 198, at 19 (“The ECCC is nominally a
special chamber of the national courts of Cambodia, but it operates and receives
funding as an independent entity.”).
203. Id. at 16 (“The compromise Agreement establishing the ECCC—
particularly the decision to have a majority of Cambodian rather than international
judges, and a complex formula designed to solve disagreements between national
and international co-prosecutors and judges—was ineffective in preventing
political interference in key decisions.”); see also Interview with Robert Petit,
supra note 23 (stressing the importance of not precisely replicating the Cambodia
model).
204. Interview with Daryl Mundis, supra note 92.
205. Id.
206. See discussion infra Section 2.2(e) (“Funding Not Through Voluntary
Contributions”).
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within a country. [The former] is truly an international institute and
there are a lot of reasons for that.” 207
Hans Corell lamented that the ECCC had not been a freestanding
new institution, saying: “There is no way that I would support the
model of the Cambodian Chambers.”208 Hans Corell “had hoped for a
free-standing court” in Cambodia, noting that the Australians had
“proposed a genuine international court, but the Cambodians didn’t
want that.”209
Nicholas Koumjian opined that the Special Court worked in its
situation, although he cautioned that that does not necessarily mean
that same model would work in another situation:
I think each has their successes and their shortcomings, but, looking back
on it, I think the Special Court for Sierra Leone is one where we can say it
has completed its mandate. I think it was about 11 years. A limited
number of individuals [were] brought to justice, as is the trend in most of
the courts. In comparison to some others, this was a relatively less
expensive case. . . . I think there was a very good reaction from the
population, a very successful outreach program at that court. So, I think
that’s one example of what worked in that situation, but that doesn’t mean
it will work in another situation.210

b) Hybrid Chamber Within an Existing Court System
The ECCC was created within the existing court system. In the
circumstances of Cambodia, it was not endorsed as a model.211 Of
course, this does not necessarily imply a hybrid chamber within an
existing court system would not be a valid model elsewhere. The
new Kosovo Specialist Chambers, for example, is created within the
court system of Kosovo, while sitting in The Hague.212
207. Interview with Brenda Hollis, supra note 24.
208. Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40.
209. Id.
210. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
211. See Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40 (citing an IBA study
examining corruption in Cambodia); see also INT’L BAR ASS’N, JUSTICE VERSUS
CORRUPTION: CHALLENGES TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY IN
CAMBODIA (2015), https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?Document
Uid=4b065d2c-d691-46e5-86bf-0a17c993c938; Interview with Robert Petit, supra
note 23 (declining to endorse the Cambodia model).
212. Michael G. Karnavas, Kosovo Specialist Chamber – Part I: Its Statute and
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c) Hybrid Converting to a National War Crimes Chamber
The State Court in Sarajevo, Bosnia, is also an interesting model.
It began operations as a hybrid tribunal, with panels of Bosnian and
international judges—first a majority of international judges and later
a majority of national judges on each panel—but after a certain
period of years reverted to a domestic war crimes chamber, with
panels of solely national judges.213 Thus, rather than ceasing
operations after prosecuting a certain number of cases (as have most
hybrid tribunals to date), it continues as an ongoing domestic court,
having jurisdiction over both war crimes and organized crime.214
Nicholas Koumjian, who had worked for the war crimes chamber
of the Bosnian State Court, opined that it has been a successful
hybrid tribunal:
[I]t started out with internationals, with the prosecution and on the bench
with the judges. So initial trials were done with two international judges
and one national. It changed over time to one international and two
nationals and eventually all the internationals left. I think that was a good
process. It helped add to the legitimacy of the court. Now would the court
be further legitimized had internationals remained to some extent? I can
imagine that’s true. . . . [S]o I think the court has been a success, although
I’m certainly aware of criticisms and not surprisingly many people feel
their expectations have not been met.215

A recent report suggests the State Court is not as successful in its
current, purely national phase.216
Rules of Procedure and Evidence in a Nutshell, MICHAELGKARNAVAS.NET: INT’L
CRIM. L. BLOG (May 24, 2017), http://michaelgkarnavas.net/blog/2017/05/24/
kosovo-specialist-chambers-part-1/ (“[T]he KSC is a specialized chamber within
the Kosovo Judiciary.”).
213. BOGDAN I>#`g7k>g-, THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBER IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA: FROM HYBRID TO DOMESTIC COURT 39, 41 (2008),
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Domestic-Court2008-English.pdf (regarding the inclusion and eventual phase-out of international
personnel).
214. History of the Court of BiH, CT. BOSN. & HERZ.,
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/stranica/86/pregled (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
215. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
216. JOANNA KORNER, PROCESSING OF WAR CRIMES AT THE STATE LEVEL IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN
EUROPE 44 (2016).
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d) Each Situation is Context-Specific so Selection of One Model is
Inappropriate
Finally, as noted above, some suggested that each situation as
unique, so it is impossible to decide in the abstract which is the best
model for future hybrid tribunals. Thus, David Scheffer stated: “You
know, I don’t literally recommend one of them. They’re all very
different under different circumstances. Each one is generic to the
situation.”217 Richard Goldstone similarly stated: “One can’t
generalize. It is like any form of transitional justice; it depends on
local situations and history and economy and politics and all the rest
of it.”218 Robert Petit also opined that: “There is not one perfect
model [of hybrid tribunal].”219 He also stressed that what mattered
was not the model in the abstract, but how it applies in reality.220
Nicholas Koumjian also took the view: “I think every situation is
unique.”221
Gregory Townsend also thought there would not be one model: “I
think they need to be tailored for each particular situation. There’s
not ‘one size fits all.’”222 He also noted that the ability to utilize
domestic judges and staff depends on how “polarized” the domestic
conflict has been:
I would say that to the extent that you can involve domestic judges and
domestic staff, the longer term pay-off and capacity-building benefit
you’ll get. If it’s a highly polarized conflict that has one party against
another party, and international independence and impartiality really need
to be the hallmark of this court, then maybe you need to exclude the
domestic judiciary and have a purely three judge [international] panel.223

217. Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48.
218. Interview with Richard Goldstone, supra note 31.
219. Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23.
220. Id.
221. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
222. Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 53.
223. Id. (giving as an example, “[I]n Kosovo there were these famous UN
panels, Regulation 64 panels, [that] did allow for essentially a ‘mix and match’ as
the situation required. You could have a three-judge bench that could be all
international judges or just one international judge presiding or all domestic judges
as the case required, and so that sort of fluid, efficient decision actually helped
move the cases along and helped build judicial capacity where it was feasible.”).
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Carsten Stahn spoke of the need for “institutional creativity” in
having new forms of “hybridity”—so that each tribunal is “tailored
to the respective situation”:
I think it’s very difficult to say that there’s one [optimal] model of the
hybrid. I think precisely the new trend is a trend towards new hybridity.
So, hybrid, in full, means also institutional creativity. That is, in my view,
the lesson from the past decades. So, we indeed, have different scenarios.
We have mixed experiences with different models. So, I think in each
context basically it needs to be sorted out which way and which hybrid
format is tailored to the respective situation.224

e) Funding not Through Voluntary Contributions
The view was also expressed that any future hybrid tribunals
should be funded through UN dues or another fixed income source,
rather than voluntary contributions. It was explained that funding
through voluntary contributions—as the ECCC and Special Court for
Sierra Leone have been225—forced the tribunals to engage in
fundraising (which is not an efficient use of tribunal officials’ time),
has left hybrid tribunals in precarious financial situations when
funding runs short, and has created a situation where particular
countries are in the role of dominant funder.226 The STL is also
partly funded through voluntary contributions, and Registrar Daryl
Mundis was also critical of voluntary contributions.227
William Schabas added the view that if a country does not have to
224. Interview with Carsten Stahn, supra note 22.
225. Stuart Ford, How Leadership in International Criminal Law Is Shifting
from the United States to Europe and Asia: An Analysis of Spending on and
Contributions to International Criminal Courts, 55 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 953, 975–
79 (2011).
226. Interview with Brenda Hollis, supra note 24.
227. Interview with Daryl Mundis, supra note 92 (“[T]he STL also is very
different from some of the other tribunals or ad hoc institutions in that we require
49% of our funding to come from Lebanon under our statute, with 51% coming
from voluntary contributions from States. As the person responsible within this
institution for fundraising, I would say this is a model that should not be repeated
elsewhere simply because it is extremely difficult. . . . It should be [funded through
the] UN or . . . something like the EU, where it’s an assessed kind of contribution
or assessed funding. . . . [A] voluntarily funded institution really is a bit of a
problem [as is] any kind of funding mechanism where you are depending on one
state for 49%—[that] is also a potentially precarious situation.”).
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financially contribute to the cost of an institution, such as Sierra
Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the country may
prove insufficiently invested in it.228
3. Skeptics of Scenario 2
Other interviewees were skeptical that additional hybrid tribunals
would be created in the future. These interviewees tended to be
supporters of Scenarios 1 and/or 3, and their views are expressed as
support for those Scenarios.229
Additionally, for instance, Richard Goldstone opined:
I don’t think [the creation of more hybrid tribunals] is going to happen,
save in cases where the ICC doesn’t have jurisdiction. It’s conceivable in
cases where the crimes ante-date July 1, 2002. But, each year that goes
past, it becomes less likely because it’s too far back . . . . [Also,] [i]t’s an
unlikely scenario because to get a hybrid you have to have the country in
which the crimes were committed involved. And that’s not going to
happen too frequently, and those sorts of countries will be States Parties
to the Rome Statute. I can’t see any countries who are not States Parties
wanting a hybrid rather than to request, even if they are not members, as
Côte d’Ivoire, which submitted to jurisdiction even without ratifying. I
think that would be a more likely scenario than to set up a hybrid
tribunal.230

Judge Agius was similarly skeptical that there would be more
hybrid tribunals: “I don’t think that the tendency is towards a
proliferation of further ad hoc tribunals or hybrid courts.”231
Some of the criticisms revolved around: (1) the cost of hybrid
tribunals; (2) the difficulties associated with local ownership; and (3)
victim dissatisfaction with the high costs and slow speed of
prosecutions, and the limited number prosecuted.

228. Interview with William Schabas, supra note 17.
229. See supra Section 1.1; see infra Section 3.1.
230. Interview with Richard Goldstone, supra note 31.
231. Interview with Carmel Agius, supra note 33 (noting that exceptions might
be a tribunal to deal with the downing of Flight MH17 over Ukraine and the new
chamber being established for Kosovo).
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a) Cost of Hybrid Tribunals and Rebuttal of Criticism
The point was made that hybrid tribunals have not proven as
inexpensive as they were originally envisioned to be.232 Cost has
been a factor for which hybrid tribunals have been criticized—
particularly given, sometimes, the limited number of individuals
prosecuted.233 The Special Court for Sierra Leone prosecuted nine
individuals, although thirteen were indicted.234 The ECCC is
prosecuting its second and third accused, and it is unclear whether
there will be additional trials.235 The STL is prosecuting four
remaining accused, all in absentia.236 The Extraordinary African
Chambers in the Senegalese Court System tried one accused, former
Chadian president Hissène Habré.
When asked about this cost criticism, many defended the cost of
hybrid tribunals. David Scheffer stated:
But, I do think the cost issue, a lot is made of this and I always want
people to sort of step back a little bit and recognize that in a comparative
sense, the cost of these war crimes tribunals is minimal compared to the
cost of domestic legal systems. I mean the cost that was undertaken to
investigate and prosecute the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 in the
232. Interview with Richard Goldstone, supra note 31 (“It’s really expensive. In
today’s terms, I guess you are looking at minimum of 150 to 200 million dollars to
set up a hybrid tribunal.”).
233. RYAN & MCGREW, supra note 198, at 12–13, 16, 32, 73, 99.
234. RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, HTTP://RSCSL.ORG/ (LAST
VISITED DEC. 26, 2017); Interview with Joseph Kamara, Anti-Corruption Comm’r,
Attorney-Gen. & Minister of Justice, Sierra Leone, in Nuremberg, Ger. (Sept. 30,
2016) (speaking of the impact of the Special Court despite prosecuting only 9
perpetrators).
235. Trial 001 involved one accused. Trials 002/01 and 002/02 involve two
accused (although four were originally indicted, with one deceased and one
adjudicated incompetent). The Cambodian Government is attempting to block
prosecutions in cases 003 and 004, involving four additional potential accused.
RYAN & MCGREW, supra note 198, at 12–13, 15 (“The initial budget for the ECCC
projected a three-year operation at a cost of about $50 million. Ten years later, the
Court is still going, and about to exceed a quarter billion dollars in total
spending.”).
236. There originally were five accused, but due to the death of one accused,
four are now being prosecuted. Prosecutor v. Ayyash, STL-1101/T/AC/AR126.11, Decision on Badreddine Defence Interlocutory Appeal of the
“Interim Decision on the Death of Mr. Mustafa Amine Badreddine and Possible
Termination of Proceedings,” ¶ 3 (Special Tribunal for Lebanon July 11, 2016).
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United States or the cost that was undertaken to, and is still being
undertaken to respond to 9/11 in the United States, the cost of
Guantánamo, which is very controversial, but guess what, there is still the
cost of it. These costs dwarf what the tribunals cost, absolutely dwarf it.237

At the same time, Scheffer acknowledged the importance of
demonstrating efficiency to donor countries in order to receive
funding.238
In explaining the cost of the Sierra Leone Special Court, Brenda
Hollis noted:
[I]f we look at Sierra Leone specifically, that court was created at the
request of the government of Sierra Leone and the legislature in Sierra
Leone ratified it. So, you had the leadership of the country saying, “Give
us an international court.” Secondly, I think it’s a false assumption to say
that the money if it wasn’t spent on the court it would come to our
country. I am not sure it would. I am not sure at all it would. Thirdly, I
think that these critics are ignoring the fact that a tremendous amount of
aid goes to these countries. We did some informal calculations and it was
amazing how much money had gone to Sierra Leone.239

Prosecutor Hollis also suggested that, rather than measuring the
cost of each person prosecuted, one might alternatively measure the
number of crimes covered by the cases:
[I]n terms of the number of people that were indicted you can turn it
around and say what were the number of crimes that were disposed of in
these cases and you’re talking about tens of thousands of crimes for which
accountability was attached. . . . And so, you may have thirteen people we
indicted, ten went to trial, nine to judgment, but these were individuals
that in our belief based on the evidence we had gathered were the greatest
responsible for the tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of crimes
that were committed there. So, if you talk about a case that determines
accountability on that scale then all of a sudden that money becomes more
relative.240

237. Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48.
238. Id.
239. Interview with Brenda Hollis, supra note 24.
240. Id.; see also Interview with David Crane, supra note 3 (stating “I think the
Special Court became expensive because of the Charles Taylor [case]” that it came
“later in the life of the court” and noting that the cost of prosecutions at Nuremberg
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Prosecutor Robert Petit observed the value of helping to rebuild a
society, which cannot be measured by purely numeric calculations:
Ask them if in their own country they think their own justice system is too
expensive and they should do away with it? There has to be accountability
for crimes. Can it be done better in a more cost-efficient manner? Of
course there can always be improvement and there should be, and
anybody who has control over a budget should be held accountable.
That’s a given. However, justice has its own price, but it has a reward
that’s not calculated, or able to be calculated, in money. Its impact is not a
budget line. It’s what it helps, how it helps society to rebuild. So, I don’t
think you can put a price on it because that return is over many
generations. Yes, you’re accountable. You should be careful with the
money you’re given, but the return is not only in dollars. . . . 241

Daryl Mundis noted the high cost of international justice, but that
continued armed conflict costs far more:
Now, yes, international criminal justice is extremely expensive, but
international conflicts are extremely expensive in terms of military costs,
in terms of costs to economies, in terms of disruption to individual
people’s lives and of course all of the non-financial non-economic costs,
the suffering of war that individual people and families experience, which
is the costliest aspect of any conflict. So, yes, international justice is
expensive. Try the alternative. So, if we can avoid conflicts through
deterrence. If we can avoid scale and scope of conflict through holding
certain people accountable in country A, whereas potential perpetrators in
country B might see that and say that’s a bad idea to start a conflict here,
then I think it’s certainly money well spent.242

Serge Brammertz similarly noted the minimal cost of tribunals
compared to continued armed conflict, and the contribution of
removing high-level perpetrators from power:
[O]bviously it is impossible to measure the savings you have by taking
out of a system individuals we consider as being the worst war criminals
you can imagine. So, personally, I’ve never ever been convinced by these
arguments. I remember giving a lecture at Harvard University two years
ago, and where one [person] in the auditorium made a comment of this
nature mentioning the number of billions which have been spent, and then
“in today’s dollars” was “22 million dollars per person”).
241. Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23.
242. Interview with Daryl Mundis, supra note 92.
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one of the professors stood up and said well I made this calculation [that]
the cost of the 25 years of existence of the ICTY are similar to a very
limited number of days of costs of the war in Afghanistan. So, the cost
argument as a negative one has never been convincing for me because we
all hope that accountability and making sure that there is no impunity
must have deterrence which is much broader than the case in which you
are conducting the investigation. And I think that Europe and the
countries of the former Yugoslavia would look today very, very different
if a number of important people would not have been prosecuted and
taken out of the debate.243

A similar argument was presented by Gregory Townsend.244
In defending the cost of the ICTY, Judge Agius noted its
important contribution to the rule of law and “that the world would
be much, much worse today had they not created the ICTY and the
ICTR”:
[I]f you did not have judges to observe and ensure the rule of law, the
whole country might be in a mess, and that could cost you more. And the
same message I have for the members of the Security Council, including
our friends and our allies, because they too are very sensitive when it
comes to costs. I think some of them have had just enough of forking out
millions and millions and millions of dollars every year in order to keep
this tribunal and, previously, the Rwanda Tribunal going. But I think it is
important that they realize that the world would be much, much worse
today had they not created the ICTY and the ICTR way back in 1993 and
1994.245

Hans Corell noted the need to contain costs by not translating into
too many languages.246
243. Interview with Serge Brammertz, supra note 68.
244. Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15 (noting the ICTY’s
contributions to peace by incapacitating key political actors and described the
Tribunal’s cost as “a drop in the bucket” compared to the cost of ongoing conflict).
245. Interview with Carmel Agius, supra note 33 (adding, puzzlingly, “It’s not a
very strong argument, however because I would avoid discussing it much more
than proposing it as a worthwhile thing to consider” and lamenting that creation of
the ICTY and ICTR did not deter crimes in other locations).
246. Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40 (deciding the ECCC did not
need translations into Russian, particularly when the request came from Cambodia
not Russia and stating “So, this means you could actually reduce the languages that
you use in the court, and maybe have local languages also that would facilitate
enormously for the court. Because the moment you have to have interpreters for
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Daryl Mundis offered a proposal for a freestanding registry that
could in the future service prosecutors and judges in multiple
different situations.247 Other innovative ideas of his included having
“courtrooms in containers that you could just drop in and within 3
days you could have a court up and running,” and having “something
like an international peace corps that does justice.”248
b) Difficulties of Local Ownership in Terms of Preserving
Independence and Impartiality
While Serge Brammertz spoke of one of the benefits of hybrid
tribunals allowing for local ownership, he also noted the difficulties
that can come from local ownership—a difficulty ad hocs do not
share:
[R]emember the time I was in Lebanon, I dealt during two years with the
Hariri Investigation Commission. I had very, very big difficulties in
finding Arabic-speaking prosecutors, investigators, analysts who were
willing to join the Investigation Commission because it was very delicate.
So, one problem created by proximity to the crime scene, is that the closer
you are getting to the area where their crimes have been committed, the
higher the likelihood that people you would hire would be at least
perceived as being biased towards one or the other side in the conflict,
which in an extreme situation would indeed be an argument to go for an
ad hoc solution where you have a kind of ad hoc tribunal which is located
elsewhere and where the entire team is composed by professionals who
have no link at all to the region.249

As noted above, local ownership, if one includes involvement of
the State, has also proven a negative factor for the ECCC.250
several languages, then the costs are just soaring.”).
247. Interview with Daryl Mundis, supra note 92 (“Approximately 65–70% of
the cost of the tribunal are actually borne by the registry, it’s the support, it’s the
building maintenance, it’s the security, it’s the IT, it’s the human resources, it’s the
procurement, it’s the victims and witnesses section, court management section,
language services section. All these overhead costs are borne by the registry. They
are services the registry provides to the other organs and to the chambers. We
might want to consider a model where there is an international registry that’s
established in which for future conflicts the international community is able to plug
in a module.”).
248. Id.
249. Interview with Serge Brammertz, supra note 68.
250. RYAN & MCGREW, supra note 198, at 13.
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Hans Corell also drew a contrast between Sierra Leone, where the
Sierra Leoneans nominated a judge from another country, “[w]hilst
in Cambodia, they insisted that these should be judges from the
Cambodian system.”251 “But . . . Sierra Leone really wanted a
genuine court, whilst Cambodia wanted a court that they could
control from the government. . . .”252 He also stated: “But in this case
with Cambodia, . . . what I warned against actually happened.”253
c) Victim Dissatisfaction at High Costs, Slow Speed, and Limited
Number Prosecuted
Commenting on the difficulty in explaining to Sierra Leoneans
that the Special Court would only prosecute a few individuals, Hans
Corell provided this moving account:
Here, I never forget my meeting with the traditional chiefs, some twentyfive of them—a few were women. And they asked me: “What can I tell
my people?” One of the chiefs rose in his dignified African way and
asked the question: “What can I tell my people when you come here with
this Court that can judge only a few when we know among us there are so
many who have committed the most heinous crimes?” And I thought for a
moment: what can I say as a white European to this African chief? And,
all of a sudden, it came to me. “Well look at your own continent. Look at
Nelson Mandela, Madiba. What did he say when he came out of prison?
Look at Kofi Annan. How do they act? So, you have now also a
reconciliation commission in Sierra Leone, so these will work in parallel.”
And this is the only way ahead because even the best organized national
criminal justice system would crumble if all these people would be
brought to justice. And I saw in my eyes, when I came in my armored car
to go to the negotiations, there were children coming, showing arms with
no hands. Or a little boy sitting on a little four-wheeled thing, pushing
himself forward like if he [were] on skis. His legs had been chopped off.
And these were crimes committed by other young people who had been
drugged and taught by grownups to commit these crimes.254

Nicholas Koumjian also spoke of victims’ frustration at the high
costs, slow speed, and limited number of prosecutions:
251.
252.
253.
254.

Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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[Victims] think it costs too much money and it’s too slow. I don’t
generally disagree with them about that. I think it’s very important in
international justice to think of ways to make it more efficient and make it
faster. But, I explain to them simply that we are limited by the jurisdiction
of the court that was established by a treaty and the resources that are
available.255

(The author notes that while none of the interviewees raised victim
dissatisfaction with the high cost, slow speed and limited number
prosecuted by the ICC and ad hoc tribunals, those views no doubt
would also exist.) 256
4. Can a Case Be Made for Future Regional Criminal Chambers?
As noted above, a regional criminal court could also be envisioned
in the future as another venue for prosecuting core atrocity crimes.
For instance, both Hassan Jallow257 and David Crane258 spoke of the
potential role of such a regional court.259
Renan Villacis spoke of the role both hybrid tribunals and regional
courts could have in complementing the ICC:
There will be situations of course where countries or regions feel they
might need a hybrid court. There are some ideas of having regional courts

255. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
256. For discussion of concerns with the high costs of victim representation at
the ICC, see interview with William Schabas, text accompanying supra note 52.
The ICTY indicted 161 individuals, but still some victims groups are dissatisfied it
did not conduct even more prosecutions. See Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures,
UNITED
NATIONS:
MECHANISM
FOR
INT’L
CRIM.
TRIBUNALS,
http://www.icty.org/en/content/infographic-icty-facts-figures (last visited Mar. 16,
2018).
257. Interview with Hassan Jallow, supra note 3 (“Africa is already taking
initiative with the preparation of a draft protocol to amend the Statute of the
[African Court of Justice and Human Rights], in order, to give it criminal
jurisdiction. That is another direction I think, which we will see developing, and, I
think, ideally, that is what I would like to see.”).
258. Interview with David Crane, supra note 3 (“I think that we need to make
sure that we keep an open mind on accountability and that accountability can be a
local court, domestic court, or with international help. It can be a regional court of
some sort, or can be an international court[.]”).
259. But see Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15 (speaking of
Syria, “and the regional [tribunals] I see as being too weak or not able to get
jurisdiction over the . . . highest levels of responsibility”).
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out there, which is something that wasn’t foreseen in the Rome
Statute. . . . [T]hose regional initiatives may at some point be helpful for
the broader process. It may deal with . . . criticism that is sometimes made
of the ICC in terms of [being] a distant court, way in Northern Europe, far
away from the victims.260

The recent “Malabo Protocol,”261 by which the jurisdiction of the
yet-to-be established African Court of Justice and Human Rights was
expanded to cover a variety of crimes,262 suggests the potential of
regional criminal tribunals. Yet, the Malabo Protocol has a startlingly
broad immunity provision.263 Hassan Jallow opined that that
immunity provision would need to be removed.264
5. Can a Case Be Made for Future Ad Hoc Tribunals?
Conventional wisdom is that states view the ad hoc tribunals as
too expensive and a model that will not be replicated.265 Yet, the ad
260. Interview with Renan Villacis, supra note 45.
261. African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government [AU-AHSG],
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights arts. 16–17 (June 27, 2014) [hereinafter Malabo
Protocol].
262. Amnesty Int’l, Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications of
the Expanded African Court, AFR 01/3063/2016, at 14–15 (2016); see Malabo
Protocol, supra note 261, art. 28A(1)–(2) (in addition to the Rome Statute crimes,
the Protocol covers unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism,
mercenaryism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in
drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, and illicit exploitation of natural resources).
263. Malabo Protocol, supra note 261, art. 46A bis (“No charges shall be
commenced or continued before the court against any serving AU Head of State of
Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior
state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office.”).
264. Comments of Hassan Jallow, Chief Justice of The Gambia, at Georgetown
University, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 4, 2017).
265. Some, for example, have argued that the money expended on the ICTR
would have been better spent on rebuilding the Rwandan judiciary. See José E.
Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L
L. 365, 466 (1999) (“[E]ach dollar spent by the international community on the
ICTR is one less dollar available for assistance to Rwandan courts”). Yet, that
ignores both that “it is unlikely . . . that international donors would have been
willing to finance the Rwandan judiciary system at anywhere near the levels of
financing for the ICTR” and the extreme unlikelihood of high-level accused
génocidaires receiving anything resembling fair trials in Rwanda. See Lars
Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 46 n.245 (2006).
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hoc tribunals are also the tribunals that, to date, have prosecuted the
greatest number of cases at the international level from any one
situation, with the ICTY having issued 161 indictments,266 and the
ICTR having issued 93.267
Despite acknowledged skepticism regarding future ad hoc
tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR, interviewees were asked whether
there might be a conceivable case made for them, for instance, to
prosecute mass atrocities such as those occurring in Syria (were this
politically feasible, which, at present, it is not).268 The ICTY and
ICTR are here suggested as potential models in terms of their
capacity, not their creation through the UN Security Council. (Given
Russia’s veto power, it seems improbable the Security Council
would create a Syria tribunal while the Assad regime remains event
partly in power.)
Most interviewees opined that there would be no future ad hoc
tribunals.269 A few interviewees, however, endorsed the view that in
266. Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures, supra note 256.
267. Key Figures of Cases, UNITED NATIONS: MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM.
TRIBUNALS, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases (last visited Jan. 6,
2017).
268. Tribunals to date have generally been created either by the UN Security
Council (as were the ICTY, ICTR, and STL) or agreement between the UN and the
host country (as were the ECCC and Special Court for Sierra Leone). As to Syria,
neither method appears possible. Russia has repeatedly vetoed resolutions
pertaining to Syria (suggesting a future Syria tribunal will not be created through
the UN Security Council). See, e.g., Ian Black, Russia and China Veto UN Move to
Refer Syria to International Criminal Court, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2014, 11:07
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-undraft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court. Furthermore, the Assad
Government (which currently appears poised to retain control over significant parts
of the country) will certainly not consent to a tribunal, given the regime’s own
criminal exposure. See, e.g., Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, Human Rights Council on its Thirty-First Session, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/31/CRP.1, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian
Arab Republic, paras. 83–99 (Feb. 3, 2016) (concluding Government forces are
implicated in crimes against humanity and war crimes). What could be needed is a
creative new approach—such as a regional hybrid tribunal, created by various
Middle Eastern countries (preferably, ones not involved in the war in Syria), and
the UN General Assembly. See Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48.
269. See Interview with Judge Carmel Agius, supra note 33 (invoking the high
cost of his own tribunal as a reason it would not be replicated for Syria); Interview
with Hassan Jallow, supra note 3 (“I doubt whether we’ll see any new ad hoc
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terms of capacity, the ICTY and ICTR could provide a model for a
future Syria tribunal, or elsewhere, should there be the political will
to create one.270
For example, Gregory Townsend argued that “an ad hoc for Syria
for me [is] the model that makes the most sense.” He explained:
I think in the breadth and scope . . . people look at the conflict in Syria
and say this is this generation’s Yugoslav conflict. So, I see the analogous
solution working. Now, would it be costly? Would it take a long time?
Absolutely. Do I think a freestanding institution makes more sense? I
think the volume speaks more than perhaps anything. We had six trials
going on here [at the ICTY] at one time in three separate courtrooms and
so would that essentially take over a huge amount of the ICC’s capacity?
Yes. And, so, from a capacity and courtroom, even just physical location
sense, for me [the situation in Syria] requires that. You have high-level
suspects in Syria that would obviously warrant international adjudication.
I wouldn’t push this down to a Syrian version of the Iraqi High Tribunal if
I could put it that way. And the international presence warrants this size
and scope of an investment. . . . And if you say the ICTR was created
because why are we creating the ICTY in Yugoslavia and not doing

being created in the future. They’ve proven to be very, very effective like the
ICTY and the ICTR, but they’ve also been very difficult to manage in terms of
cost, in terms of time, etc. I think the international community is less likely to
proceed with that and more with the hybrid system, and encourage the
empowerment also of regional courts.”).
270. See Interview with Brenda Hollis, supra note 24 (“I think that if there is an
ad hoc court in the future, I mean there could be. . . . But given the atmosphere in
the Security Council I don’t think it would be a Chapter VII court.”); Interview
with Daryl Mundis, supra note 92 (When asked “wouldn’t we need something the
size of the ICTY for the Syria conflict if we are serious about justice?” Mundis
responded: “I’m afraid so. . . . You’re going to need an institution that’s going to
be about the size of the ICC looking at Syria and it’s going to be extremely
expensive[.]”); Interview with Richard Goldstone, supra note 31 (“You know it is
possible, if there was sufficient political will. It is all a question of the politics.
And, you know, I would think there is more likely to be more push for some sort of
domestic court even if it’s augmented by international judges and prosecutors. But,
you know there is no point in foisting courts on unwilling parties because without
their cooperation, the court can’t function.”); Interview with Serge Brammertz,
supra note 68 (“I probably think that an ad hoc solution for Syria would be
important independently of the ICC question. But, if I say ad hoc solution or
hybrid, I mean everything else but ICC or the national level. So, I’m not excluding
an ad hoc tribunal, but it’s obvious that one of the reasons that the hybrid tribunals
and the ICC were created was that it was considered being very time-consuming
and costly to set up a full-fledged ad hoc tribunal in relation to one situation.”).
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anything for [Rwanda], I could again make the argument a third time.271

In response to the question about a future ad hoc tribunal for Syria,
Hans Corell stated only that the Security Council can set up more ad
hocs but appeared unpersuaded: “[T]he Rome Statute does not mean
that the Security Council is prevented from establishing more courts
along the lines of ICTY and ICTR. They can do that. There’s no
legal objection to that. [Yet], here I think it’s a question of being
pragmatic and see to the realities on the ground.”272
Robert Petit also noted as to the cost of the ad hoc tribunals: “[I]f
you tend to focus on just the numbers game [as to ad hocs], you
might miss the point. These are not money-making ventures, they’re
to account for mass violations of human rights, and their impact in
not measured in dollars. . . .”273

III. SCENARIO #3:
COMPLEMENTARITY/DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS
AS THE DOMINANT APPROACH OF THE FUTURE
This was the third scenario presented to interviewees:
In the third scenario, complementarity or domestic prosecutions
become the most dominant feature of the future of the field.
“Complementarity” refers to national court prosecutions in Rome
Statute States Parties. Yet, there is also need to strengthen the
capacity of domestic courts to prosecute atrocity crimes in non-Rome
Statute States Parties—indeed, possibly greater need, since the ICC
will not be conducting prosecutions in such countries absent a UN
Security Council referral. In this third scenario, there is less need for
the ICC or hybrid (or other) tribunals, as there is a shift towards
domestic capacity to prosecution atrocity crimes. This may occur
before a specialized war crimes chamber or the ordinary court
system. Thus, national courts would have much stronger capacity
271. Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15.
272. Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40.
273. Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23; see also supra notes 22–24 and
accompanying text (suggesting a tribunal’s merit should not simply be judged by a
calculation of the cost per prosecution, and there are many tribunal benefits that
may not be subject to quantitative measurement).
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(and, ideally, will) to fairly conduct atrocity crime prosecutions.274
Interviewees were then asked:
1. Is Scenario #3 the most likely scenario in twenty years’ time? Why
or why not?
2. Should complementarity/domestic capacity-building be centrally
coordinated or conducted?
a.

Why or why not?

b.

If so, by what entity?

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR SCENARIO #3
Various interviewees expressed the view that, over the next twenty
years, Scenario #3 was likely. As noted above, some interviewees
suggested that Scenario #1 and Scenario #3, combined, represented
the future of the field.275
Others
were
skeptical
that
domestic
prosecutions/complementarity276 would be the way of the future
because high-level prosecutions of large-scale atrocity crimes are too
difficult for most domestic judiciaries to tackle. And, others
suggested that whether domestic prosecutions/complementarity
could work in any particular country very much depended on the
situation in that country. The view was also expressed that not only
274. As explained above, none of the scenarios rules out the use of additional
transitional justice tools (over and above prosecutions), nor the exercise of
universal jurisdiction in national courts.
275. See supra Section 1.1(e) (“Combining Scenarios 1 and 3”).
276. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32 (“Under the Rome Statute
primarily you retain the responsibility to investigate and prosecute these crimes. It
is only when you cannot that this institution that you are a part of takes on the
responsibility to investigate and prosecute. So, in a way, I always look at the ICC
as an attempt to ensure there is no impunity because that’s what we wanted to
make sure [doesn’t] happen. But at the same time, we looked for a way of
developing the domestic jurisdictions so that they will not have the need to go to
the ICC when these crimes take place. So, this is the system that we have created,
the system of States being part of the ICC, knowing that if they cannot prosecute,
the ICC will come; knowing that if there is no political will, the ICC will come;
but, at the same time, if they are doing it themselves, the ICC will not come. I think
it’s a beautiful system. It is a system that we are seeing evolve over time.”).
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national prosecutions, but also hybrid and regional tribunals should
be viewed as part of complementarity.
As to whether a centralized entity/institution should lead capacitybuilding efforts, many suggested that centralized coordination would
be helpful, with some suggesting the ICC could lead this effort in
ICC situation countries. Several opined that the ICC should not
perform the actual capacity-building work, but should play only a
facilitation role. Some argued that there should not be another entity
coordinating domestic capacity-building in ICC situation countries,
as that could create competition with the ICC’s efforts. A few
suggested that the current ad hoc approach suffices—with domestic
capacity-building/rule of law work conducted by various
development actors and States, and funded through various donor
countries, without overall coordination. Some were skeptical of one
large organization conducting capacity-building work—both that
individual countries might not welcome what could be seen as
interference in their national court systems, and donor countries
might choose to retain control over how they invest funding.
Domestic court prosecutions of atrocity crimes may occur before a
country’s ordinary domestic courts,277 before its military courts,278 or
277. For example, war crimes prosecutions in Croatia occur before the four
largest district courts. See Amnesty Int’l, Behind a Wall of Silence: Prosecution of
War Crimes in Croatia, EUR 64/003/2010, 6 (2010). In Bosnia, in addition to the
hybrid State Court in Sarajevo, local war crimes prosecutions occur before
cantonal courts in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and district courts in
Republika Srpska). Bosnia and Herzegovina: Local Courts Face Obstacles in War
Crimes Trials, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 10, 2008, 8:00 PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/07/10/bosnia-and-herzegovina-local-courts-faceobstacles-war-crimes-trials. See also Jonathan Gilbert, Ex-Military Officers
Convicted of Human Rights Crimes During Argentina Dictatorship, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/world/americas/argentinatrial-cordoba.html (writing about convictions of “38 former military officials” in an
Argentine federal court); World Report 2017: Guatemala, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan.
2017),
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/guatemala
(detailing Guatemala’s progress in prosecuting corruption and human rights cases);
World Report 2017: Chile, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/chile
(describing
prosecutions in Chile before military and civilian courts).
278. For example, military courts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
have prosecuted war crimes and crimes against humanity since the DRC’s selfreferral to the ICC in 2004.
William W. Burke-White, Proactive
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before a specialized war crimes chamber.279 The advantage of the
latter is to potentially centralize expertise before one court; creating a
specialized war crimes chamber may also attract added donor
funding, assistance and/or training.

B. DETAILED FINDINGS FOR SCENARIO #3
1. Proponents of Scenario #3 and Rationales
Various interviewees expressed the view that, over the next twenty
years, Scenario #3 was the most likely. Some of the factors they cited
were: (1) that national justice “has to be delivered where the crimes
have happened”;280 (2) the benefits of strengthening national
institutions; (3) that strengthening rule of law can avoid future
conflict; and (4) that international institutions do not have the
capacity to prosecute large numbers, which domestic courts could
potentially do.
For example, Sierra Leone’s Anti-Corruption Commissioner,
Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Joseph Kamara opined on
the importance of prosecuting atrocity crimes before national courts:
Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the
Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 106 (2008)
(explaining that numerous convictions have occurred as a result of these domestic
military courts using the Rome Statute as the operative law and basis for the
convictions); see, e.g., DR Congo Puts Fighters on Trial for Civilian Massacres,
AL JAZEERA (Aug. 20, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/dr-congoputs-fighters-trial-civilian-massacres-160820160714182.html (“A military court in
the DRC has begun the trial of 215 members of an armed group accused of killing
hundreds of civilians in and around Beni town in the country’s northeast.”).
279. See International Crimes Division, JUDICIARY REPUBLIC UGANDA,
http://www.judiciary.go.ug/data/smenu/18/International%20Crimes%20Division.ht
ml (last visited Mar. 16, 2018) (detailing the establishment of a specialized
chamber in Uganda known as the International Crimes Division of the High
Court); Kirsty McNamara, Seeking Justice in Ugandan Courts: Amnesty and the
Case of Thomas Kwoyelo, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 653, 653 (2013)
(explaining that in 2008, the Government of Uganda established the International
Crimes Division to try individuals alleged to have committed international crimes
during the 20-year insurgency in northern Uganda); see also Justice for Serious
Crimes Before a National Court: Uganda’s International Crimes Division, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Jan. 15, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/01/15/justiceserious-crimes-national-courts/ugandas-international-crimes-division (providing an
overview of the International Crime Division’s progress in Uganda).
280. Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23.
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I do have a very strong view that building the capacity of national
institutions is the way forward, and that international bodies such as the
ICC . . . could be a last resort. . . .
I [endorse] the option that will strengthen the national institutions,
because justice is not just about war crimes. There are many, many other
offences, as I was saying, about sexual violence and even armed robbery.
And then everything that will [occur] to a community, that is their prime
concern, and the address system or the remedy system should be in their
immediacy. . . .
[T]he international community should prioritize the strengthening of
national institutions rather than building more ad hoc courts, because . . .
it gives the results but it takes too long and sometimes [is] too far away
from the people with whom the intent was meant to rebuild. Normally, in
justice, when you do justice, delivery is not just about sending people to
jail, it’s about building the community. It’s about the community coming
to accept the outcome, that there was a redress mechanism. These are
aspects that cannot be overlooked.281

Serge Brammertz similarly opined on the benefits of local trials:
“[T]he advantage of course would be that justice is rendered close to
the victims’ and perpetrators’ communities, which is today the
biggest weakness of international tribunals because perpetrators’
communities mainly distance themselves very much from something
which is happening far, far away.”282 While he endorsed Scenario #3
as the “best case scenario,” Brammertz also found it to be “wishful
thinking” that national courts would be able to handle atrocity crimes
prosecutions by themselves.283
Matthew Gillett also opined on the benefits of local trials:
[I]n theory whenever you can have domestic proceedings for the crimes in
the locations where they occurred or close to where they occurred that is
preferable. We are starting to see that with courts like the Mobile Court in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and this is not only preferable from a
resource perspective because of the proximity to the crime scenes, the
281. Interview with Joseph Kamara, supra note 234.
282. Interview with Serge Brammertz, supra note 68.
283. Id. (“I would say the best-case scenario would . . . be that complementarity
is working in a way that all countries can deal with atrocities committed on their
territories by themselves. Unfortunately, this is very much wishful thinking if we
look at the world today that I’m not too optimistic about.”).
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victims, the judges, but it is also preferable for the other let’s say less
tangible aspects of the proceedings in terms of encouraging reconciliation,
the acceptance of the proceedings, the awareness of the proceedings.284

Matthew Gillett also noted that local prosecutions are needed
because international tribunals cannot conduct all prosecutions:
Realistically in twenty years’ time there will have to be more domestic
proceedings for these types of crimes where possible, and there simply is
going to have to be more capacity-building support to these domestic
initiatives because the ICC or whatever ad hoc tribunal is set up in the
future is never going to be capable of handling all the cases. And, for
example, here, at the Yugoslav Tribunal we only deal with a small
percentage of the crimes that were actually committed in the former
Yugoslavia. Many more are dealt with by domestic courts in the region.
So, resources and capacity-building are going to be critical in supporting
those domestic efforts.285

Hans Corell noted the importance of rule of law for avoiding
conflict: “If I looked at any conflict in the world—anywhere, and at
any time really—and asked the question: why is there a conflict?
The answer is the same. No democracy, no rule of law. That’s the
recipe for conflict.”286
Others noted that “Scenario three is a real possibility,” but that it
would only happen if States are supported with more “capacitybuilding.”287 As mentioned above, some interviewees suggested that
Scenario #1 and Scenario #3, combined, represented the future of the
field.
Fatou Bensouda opined: “So what I see really coming in the future
is that domestic jurisdictions will perhaps be more active. We are
already seeing it happen.”288 She mentioned the ICC’s current work
as to Uganda, Guinea, and Mali.289
284. Interview with Matthew Gillett, supra note 15.
285. Id.
286. Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40.
287. Interview with David Crane, supra note 3 (“[W]e’ve got to support
them . . . to create capacity at the State Party level to do this. And in 25 years,
we’ve got something pretty cool but that’s not where the emphasis is. It is inward
[to the ICC] not outward [to complementarity].”).
288. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32.
289. Id.
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Several suggested that national court prosecutions will always
play a role in the field, even if they do not become the dominant
model, or central focus. Thus, there will always be a role for
domestic prosecutions/complementarity, without it being the central
feature of the system of international justice. In this way, Scenario #3
can be consistent with either Scenarios #1 or #2, or both Scenarios
#1 and #2, as none of the scenarios is mutually exclusive.
Robert Petit noted that there were “best practices” for national
courts, but not necessarily one single model of how they should
function.290
Hassan Jallow opined that not only national prosecutions, but also
hybrid and regional tribunals should be viewed as part of
complementarity:
I’d like to see an ICC which really is in the forefront in helping to
strengthen these hybrid and regional courts, which are being proposed and
not see them as kind of outside the system. Bring them into the chain of
complementarity. Help the African region develop its own international
criminal court.291

2. Skeptics of Scenario #3
Other
interviewees
were
skeptical
that
domestic
prosecutions/complementarity would be the way of the future. These
interviewees tended to be supporters of Scenario #2, or simply
skeptical of domestic capacity to fairly conduct major war crimes
trials. Some of the reasons for skepticism included: (1) the
tremendous difficulty of national judiciaries conducting high-level
prosecutions in an even-handed and fair manner, particularly vis-àvis the gravest atrocity crimes; (2) the difficulty of a State
prosecuting “its own” state actors; (3) the difficulty of building
“will” as opposed to capacity; and (4) the significant effort needed
290. Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23 (“I think there is some thought
to be given to trying to develop a more efficient, best-practice sharing model as
well as supporting these countries with money and expertise if you want that to
happen. . . . I don’t think [one] model can work. Every situation is different.
That’s why I’ve co-authored a . . . suggested practice manual. . . . So, there is no
one standard approach that should be put forth other than, of course, having a
certain standard of equity in the proceedings.”).
291. Interview with Hassan Jallow, supra note 3.
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for domestic capacity-building.
a) Difficulties of Fairly Prosecuting High-Level Perpetrators
Through National Courts
Some expressed the view that national courts would never be in a
position to bring large-scale atrocity crimes prosecutions against
former high-level officials, and that there would therefore always be
a need for additional hybrid or international tribunals. For instance,
Brenda Hollis stated:
For there to be true access to justice for victims and survivors you need an
independent and impartial judiciary. That doesn’t exist in an awful lot of
countries in this world and without that then that’s simply a way to avoid
[responsibility] or it’s only your opponents who would ever find
themselves being held accountable. Perhaps they should be held
accountable, but it should be broader than that. So, I don’t think the state
model, unless the world evolves a great deal more than it has, will ever be
truly a just model.292

She further explained that having an international court, rather
than national courts, prosecute atrocity crimes: (a) could ensure fair
trial rights for the accused; (b) could ensure strong witness
protection; (c) would not potentially threaten a fragile peace; (d)
allows the state to concentrate its limited resources on rebuilding
medical care, schools and infrastructure; and (e) allows creation of a
uniform body of jurisprudence.293
William Schabas also opined that there will always be situations
where countries are “unwilling or unable” to prosecute, so that in the
future “that’s where we will need the international institutions.”294
Nicholas Koumjian also opined on the difficulty of domestic
courts adjudicating high-level cases:
[T]here are many, many courts and countries around the world that simply
don’t have the capacity to do the cases at a high level. If you want to do it
at a high level, particularly to do cases that link leaders to crimes on the
ground is something very difficult to do and then international

292. Interview with Brenda Hollis, supra note 24.
293. Id.
294. Interview with William Schabas, supra note 17.
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involvement in the investigation and in the cases would be very useful.295

Others mentioned the importance of having national justice “up to
standards.”296
Whether complementarity could work in a particular country,
Richard Goldstone stated: “I don’t think one can generalize. I think
one has to look at each country on its own merits.”297
James Stewart opined that the ICC will always be needed because
there are things it can do that domestic courts cannot: “We can do
things as an international organization removed in a sense from a
country that in some situations local prosecutors cannot. They just
don’t have the political space to do it or they’re just too vulnerable.
The remark has been made to me by people in that situation to say,
well, there’s some things we can’t do and you can.”298
He continued:
[T]here are always going to be situations, I’m afraid, where national
authorities for one reason or another are simply not going to be able to
respond. Either you are going to have a complete breakdown of authority
or breakdown in the judiciary or the actors in place are just too powerful.
You are going to need some international action and the International
Criminal Court will always be there as the fallback.299

Judge Agius opined that only when there is political will and
commitment to observe rule of law will domestic prosecutions work:
When the time is ripe, and there is maturity on the ground and political
will and determination to make justice synonymous and tantamount to the
observance of the rule of law, then, yes, I would tell you, that having the
domestic courts and tribunals will be the ideal thing to pursue but it’s not
easy. And, until then, you need international courts.300

295. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
296. Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23; see also Interview with Daryl
Mundis, supra note 92 (“[W]e don’t want to be shifting a bunch of cases or activity
to courts that are politicized or that aren’t fair, that don’t meet international due
process standards.”).
297. Interview with Richard Goldstone, supra note 31.
298. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41.
299. Id.
300. See Interview with Judge Carmel Agius, supra note 33 (Judge Agius had a
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Renan Villacis opined that smaller/weaker states will lack capacity
for a long, long time:
[W]hy does the [ICC] exist? It was precisely because smaller states,
weaker states never felt that they had the judicial capacity to deal with
some of the crimes. This is probably the situation for a long, long time.
We can only hope that things improve around the world and [in] all the
different judicial systems, but there are many particular situations around
the world that it is very difficult to cater for.301

Nicholas Koumjian also opined that national proceedings that lack
capacity and/or legitimacy will require an international solution:
[Complementarity] will be the first . . . preference for countries involved,
but again I think there will be situations where the country will realize: we
don’t have the capacity. We don’t have the ability, for example, to secure
the safety of witnesses. We don’t have the ability that our verdicts [are]
seen as legitimate because of the divisions within society or the country.
So, I think there will be space also for international courts.302

b) Difficulty Prosecuting One’s Own Atrocity Crimes
David Scheffer was generally also skeptical whether countries
would take “self-responsibility for investigating and prosecuting
‘one’s own’ with respect to atrocity crimes.” He explained: “It’s not
that difficult to say, ‘Oh yes, if we can get jurisdiction over the
neighboring country that inflicted so much pain and suffering on us,
we’ll bring those individuals in to court and prosecute them even
under our existing national criminal code.’ But, the real question is
turning the light on one’s self and doing that.”303
Bintah Mansaray explained the difficulty of a State’s involvement
in prosecutions if the State is also potentially implicated in crimes:
“[E]ven if we strengthen domestic courts, there is a political issue.
pessimistic evaluation of the work of the local judiciaries in the former
Yugoslavia.).
301. Interview with Renan Villacis, supra note 45.
302. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
303. See Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48 (“We love the issue of
complementarity and divesting cases down to the national level. But then
sometimes things go wrong at the national level and you hear calls for ‘please,
shoot this back up to the international level’ and that’s what we’re dealing with in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”).
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Because sometimes when wars start, for instance in the case of Sierra
Leone, you had the government that had a fighting faction. And if the
government is participating in wars and then you set up courts to
prosecute atrocity crimes, who is prosecuting who?” 304
c) Differentiating Lack of Capacity from Lack of Will
It may be significant to differentiate shortcomings in capacity
(which can be rectified by international assistance) and shortcomings
in political “will”—which may be far more difficult to address. Yet,
it is possible to work on the latter, for instance through capacitybuilding mechanisms that assist in strengthening judicial
independence, or outside actors who provide political support for,305
or even insist on, an agenda that would include prosecutions that may
be unpopular with current State actors. An example of the latter is
the EU’s insistence on prosecution of Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) crimes through the Kosovo Specialist Chambers.306
d) Significant Work Needed to Build Complementarity/Domestic
Capacity
Hassan Jallow gave the reminder that it takes significant work to
build complementarity/ domestic capacity:
[A] lot more could be done to make sure complementarity works. I have
been saying that complementarity is not ready-made; it has to be created.
It has to be made. I mean, looking at our experience with the transfer of
cases to Rwanda. Many things had to be done in Rwanda, in order for
them to qualify to take on our cases. There was a whole process for
304. Interview with Bintah Mansaray, supra note 199.
305. INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, SYNTHESIS REPORT ON
SUPPORTING COMPLEMENTARITY AT THE NATIONAL-LEVEL: FROM THEORY TO
PRACTICE, para. 8 (2012) [hereinafter INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE], https://www.ictj.org/publication/synthesis-reportsupporting-complementarity-national-level-theory-practice (discussing the issue of
political will and the importance of outside actors providing development
assistance and political support).
306. Mark Kersten, The New Kosovo Tribunal - Turning Victors’ Justice on its
Head?, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Jan. 18, 2016), https://justiceinconflict.org/
2016/01/18/the-new-kosovo-tribunal-turning-victors-justice-on-its-head/
(“The
product of long-term negotiations aimed at integrating Kosovo into the European
Union, the [Kosovo Specialist Chambers] will focus exclusively on KLA
combatants[.]”).
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reform, like abolishing the death penalty, making sure the fair-trial
guarantees of the international system are reflected in Rwandan law,
taking care of the penitentiary system, training, building up capacity in the
institutions with the training of investigators and prosecutors, et cetera,
building up the political will, and so on. So, a lot of that has to be done in
order to make sure complementarity works.307

Matthew Gillett noted that funding and resource limitations can
impact domestic proceedings:
In terms of domestic capacity, I’ve been involved in a number of projects,
for instance with the Ugandan International Crimes Division of the High
Court, helping work together with the judges there for instance on their
rules of procedure and evidence. There is a lot of human talent and highly
skilled jurists, but realistically there is a funding and resource problem,
and that does have an impact on proceedings.308

3. Does Complementarity/Domestic Capacity-Building Need to be
Centrally Coordinated?
For those who supported Scenario #3, as to how one would reach
that outcome—that is, complementarity/national court trials being
the dominant mechanism, or even just a more effective mechanism in
twenty years—interviewees were asked whether capacity-building
efforts should be centralized.
a) Current Approach
Some noted the role that the ICC is already playing in trying to
facilitate “positive” complementarity. The ICC website features the
Case Matrix Network (CMN) as a way of helping build
capacity.309 The website states that the CMN provides two distinct
services:
(1) online legal tools, which “equip users with legal information, digests
and an application to work more effectively with core international crimes
307. Interview with Hassan Jallow, supra note 3.
308. Interview with Matthew Gillett, supra note 15.
309. Centre for Int’l Law Research & Policy, Knowledge-transfer, Legal
Empowerment and Capacity Development, CILRAP, https://www.casematrix
network.org/icc-legal-tools-database/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2018); Int’l Criminal
Court, Legal Tools Database, ICC, https://www.legal-tools.org (last visited Mar. 5,
2018).
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cases (involving war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or
aggression);”310 and
(2) the provision of advice and expertise either “in situ or remotely” on an
“ad hoc basis or through secondment” by a team of CMN Advisers who
have “first-hand experience with and a broad range of skills required for
the effective and fair documentation, investigation and prosecution of
serious human rights violations that may amount to core international
crimes, as well as in the legislative and administrative facilitation of such
work processes, including the formulation of best practices.”311

Renan Villacis explained: ”[O]ur efforts have been more to try to
do a mapping of possible needs of particular countries and who are
the donors or the countries who can provide assistance of a technical
nature, of a legal nature.”312
Yet, the ICC has limited capacity and resources for
complementarity.313 One could, however, imagine the ICC playing a
more robust role that would include conducting systematic needs
assessments, and linking local actors to potential donor countries and
310. Int’l Criminal Court, What are the ICC Legal Tools?, ICC,
https://www.legal-tools.org/what-are-the-icc-legal-tools (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
311. Centre for Int’l Law Research & Policy, Other Services, CILRAP,
https://www.casematrixnetwork.org/services-and-issues/other-services/
(last
visited Mar. 5, 2018); Centre for Int’l Law Research & Policy, Some Issues
Addressed By CMN Services, CILRAP, https://www.casematrixnetwork.org/
services-and-issues/issues/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). These are some issues Case
Matrix states that the CMN Services address: 1) Mapping of open case files,
2) Selection and prioritization of cases, 3) Abbreviated criminal procedures,
4) Preserving the overview of evidence, 5) Strengthening capacity on substantive
law, 6) The role of analysis in criminal justice for atrocities, 7) Balancing criminal
justice for atrocities with other transitional justice, 8) Advice on national
implementing legislation, and 9) Advice on international criminal procedure and
evidence case law.
312. Interview with Renan Villacis, supra note 45.
313. See INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, SYNTHESIS REPORT ON
SUPPORTING COMPLEMENTARITY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: AN INTEGRATED
APPROACH TO RULE OF LAW, para. 10 (2011), https://www.ictj.org/
publication/supporting-complementarity-national-level-integrated-approach-rulelaw (understanding that the ICC has limited capacity to address complementarity);
see also Int’l Criminal Ct., Rep. of the Bureau on Complementarity on its Fifteenth
Session, ICC-ASP/15/22 ¶16 (Nov. 10, 2016), https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/
asp_docs/ASP15/ICC-ASP-15-22-ENG.pdf (“States Parties and the Court have
expressed the view that the role of the Court itself is limited in actual capacitybuilding[.]”).
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other development/rule of law actors.314
Currently, there are many different actors involved in domestic
capacity-building work/rule of law, particularly from the UN and
EU. For example, according to the International Center for
Transitional Justice (ICTJ):
 The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has conducted efforts to advance
national prosecutions through its Joint Investigation Teams and
Prosecution Support Cells; 315
 The UN Development Programme has provided technical support in
Guatemala to the public prosecutor’s office allowing for the creation of a
special investigative unit; it also provides the platform for coordination
among national actors;316
 The EU, in the Ivory Coast, has implemented a justice program that
includes a “full-fledged program encompassing different parts of the
justice system.” 317

According to the International Center for Transitional Justice
(ICTJ), UN activities in relation to complementarity also include: the
[Civilian Capacity] Review process which could be useful in
identifying types of specialized capacity needed for domestic
prosecutions; the Rule of Law Indicators Project; the efforts by the
UN to strengthen national capacity to do in-country assessments; and
the efforts by ISAP in Geneva to strengthen the capacity of the UN
system to conduct assessments of national institutions. 318
314. James Stewart did not portray the ICC’s complementarity efforts as
particularly robust. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41 (“[W]e are
learning in a very practical way how to deal with these situations and we’re always
prepared to share that experience with national authorities who are trying, with
NGOs, who are trying to develop this capacity.”).
315. INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE,
supra note 305, para. 15.
316. Id. para. 16.
317. Id. para. 17; see also Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41 (noting
many different capacity-building efforts by NGOs, governments, the EU, and the
AU).
318. See INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE,
supra note 305, para. 4 (summarizing the May 2012 meeting convened by the ICTJ
and the Government of Sweden during which participants “noted the role of policy
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Gregory Townsend also cited “organizations like the Institute for
International Criminal Investigations and other actors . . . [as a good]
example of how to build capacity and complementarity.” He did not
necessarily endorse the “[Justice Rapid Response] model being the
answer of parachuting in people from rosters.”319
Hans Corell spoke of the different roles bar associations play in
rule of law development, citing the role of the American Bar
Association, the International Bar Association, and the International
Legal Assistance Consortium.320
Renan Villacis observed: “[I]n the field of complementarity there
are a large number of actors. Each one of those actors is basically
going forward with their own objectives with their own funds and in
their own regions or in their own countries of interest.”321
The kinds of assistance that can, for instance, be provided by
international or hybrid tribunals to domestic systems, include:
Training programs targeting national officials such as prosecutors,
investigators, prison guards, and witness protection officials; the transfer
of knowledge from the specialized institution to national institutions;
making archives accessible to national authorities; provision of technical
and logistical support; and raising awareness about the importance of
international criminal law through extensive outreach efforts.322

One challenge identified is that those traditionally in development
agencies and working on rule of law implementation have not
necessarily seen it as within their mandate to assist with capacitybuilding of national courts to conduct war crimes prosecutions.323
considerations when addressing complementarity efforts”).
319. Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15.
320. Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40.
321. Interview with Renan Villacis, supra note 45.
322. INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, MEETING SUMMARY OF THE
RETREAT ON “COMPLEMENTARITY AFTER KAMPALA: THE WAY FORWARD” 2
(2010).
323. See, e.g., INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, FROM THEORY TO
PRACTICE, supra note 305, para. 4 (identifying “the challenge of incorporating
efforts to prosecute the most serious crimes of international concern into existing
programs designed to build capacity for broader rule of law initiatives”); Interview
with Stephen Rapp, supra note 73 (“[C]orruption is very important, transnational
organized crime is very important, etc. But that’s where resources are going, or
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b) Whether to Centrally Coordinate Complementarity/CapacityBuilding
Many expressed support for the idea of centrally coordinating the
strengthening of complementarity/capacity-building,324 while a few
suggested that States would not want to give external actors a role in
running their legal systems, and were skeptical that such
centralization and coordination would occur.325 Others thought that
donor countries would not want to give up control over how to invest
their resources.326
For example, Hassan Jallow opined: “There should be a program
supported internationally to build capacity in order to make sure that
complementarity becomes a reality. If it doesn’t, the process of
accountability will suffer.”327
Fatou Bensouda opined:
I think [capacity-building] can be done in a more coordinated fashion than
it is currently being done. . . . [U]nder positive complementarity, . . . we
take it as our responsibility to, for instance, contact partners and bring
them into contact with the State concerned. We’ve done that in Guinea
for instance. We have been able to get other UN agencies and other
into general efforts to build national judiciaries or good prisons. . . . These are all
important goals. But focus on complementarity is a very small piece of that[.]”).
324. Interview with Brenda Hollis, supra note 24 (“[T]here’s no orchestrated
comprehensive program to deal with [domestic-capacity building]. And I think
that’s what’s needed.”); Interview with Daryl Mundis, supra note 92 (“[T]hat’s
part of the problem . . . that this is still so fragmented between the ICC and the
hybrid courts and this organization and that NGO and that government taking the
lead on these [capacity-building] issues.”); Interview with Stephen Rapp, supra
note 73 (When asked, “should this [complementarity] somehow be coordinated and
centralized within a mechanism so it’s not so ad hoc in nature?” Rapp answered,
“Well it definitely should be[.]”); Interview with Renan Villacis, supra note 45
(“There is not a central coordinating mechanism which I think may be the way
forward[.]”).
325. Interview with Richard Dicker, Director, Human Rights Watch
International Justice Program.
326. Interview with Stephen Rapp, supra note 73 (voicing skepticism of being
able to coordinate complementarity because governments do not want to be told
how to spend their money on complementarity); Interview with Renan Villacis,
supra note 45 (“You know it’s also very difficult for let’s say one country to give
up sovereign use of its resources for purposes determined by some other entity or
group of entities or group of countries.”).
327. Interview with Hassan Jallow, supra note 3.
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partners, NGOs, to assist in capacity-building. I continue to say that we
are not a development organization; we are a court. We can only give as
much as our resources allow us to do because also we have to do our core
business which demands a lot of resources and already we do not have
enough resources to do that core business. So, it becomes difficult for the
ICC to take on that role.328

Others expressed the contrary view that the current ad hoc
approach of a “coalition of the willing” of different states and other
actors doing what each is willing to do in terms of domestic court
capacity-building is sufficient at least for now.329 Stephen Rapp
suggested that complementarity would remain ad hoc—thinking of
solutions, for example, for the Habré case, CAR, and then finding
donor funding.330
Others noted that States might have sovereignty concerns, and
noted the importance of developing a two-way symbiotic
relationship:
[T]here are jurisdictional issues and sovereignty issues and each State
does have its own legal requirements for its proceedings, and so the ICC, I
think would have to act in a supportive and assisting type of role, but
should not be seen as some overarching power that can dictate how
domestic proceedings are going to be run. I think it will be important to
have that two-way communication, to develop a real symbiotic
relationship between the international level and the domestic level.331

Another way to put this is that, regardless of international
assistance, there must be domestic ownership of the process—it
cannot simply be imposed from outside.
Because of the concern about attracting donor funding, Stephen
Rapp endorsed hybrid tribunals, which he thought more likely to
attract funding, as the way to accomplish complementarity: “I think
complementarity . . . remains largely a false, concept, positive
328. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32.
329. Comments of Marieke Wierde, Rule of Law Coordinator, Dutch Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, in The Hague, Netherlands (Nov. 11, 2016); Interview with
Richard Goldstone, supra note 31 (“I don’t think there is the money to do it in a
synchronized way. I think it’s got to be ad hoc.”).
330. Interview with Stephen Rapp, supra note 73.
331. Interview with Matthew Gillett, supra note 15.
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complementarity anyway. There really isn’t any engine behind it,
and so that’s the problem. So, if . . . the ICC is running out of gas and
there’s nothing going on [in terms of] complementarity, then there’s
nothing there, you know. That’s why . . . I seek these other
approaches where we can get resources.”332
According to David Scheffer, too much centralization might create
a “heavy hand” in domestic legal systems:
[T]here are lots of international non-governmental organizations,
international bar associations, international commission of [jurists], . . .
These organizations are definitely out there doing these things. . . . [But]
if you centralized all of this too much then I think governments may be a
little too intimidated by the heavy hand that may enter their system. You
know, national criminal codes are very sensitive issues and maybe . . .
having a somewhat fragmented approach to complementarity actually has
its benefits. 333

Hans Corell warned of too much bureaucracy, and suggested there
are some areas appropriate to centralization and not others: “I think
that too much centralization . . . might create bureaucracy.”334 In
terms of judicial contact, he stressed that it needed to be person to
person, whereas educational materials could be centralized.335 He
added: “But it’s very important that you can communicate directly
with people, and also understand their particular traditions.”336
Carsten Stahn also did not endorse centralization of capacitybuilding, except to gather best practices:
I would hesitate to promote a centralization. I think that different
organizations have a role in this. So, I think regional organizations will be
key in this so I think harmonization would rather come through shared
best practices. So I think it’s very important that we take close stock of
the lessons that can be learned from domestic experiences—that we have
the best lessons on procedural practices, on how victim participation
might operate, on how reparations can be handled effectively so that these
experiences are shared. This is where I see a deficit in the existing system
where we need to centralize more that we have a community of
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Interview with Stephen Rapp, supra note 73.
Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48.
Interview with Hans Corell, supra note 40.
See id.
Id.
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knowledge in relation to these issues, but we will, in my view, always
need different institutions to actually then implement these policies and to
actually act locally on the ground.337

c) What Body, if Any, Should Centrally Coordinate
Complementarity/Capacity-Building
To the extent that interviewees endorsed centralization and
coordination, some suggested that the ICC was well-positioned to
lead the coordination within ICC States Parties, particularly because
the ICC OTP would be interacting with domestic authorities in
situation countries, and could provide information, evidence and
share best practices.338
For example, Matthew Gillett opined:
[T]he logical body to be doing that or to be channeling that support
through is some kind of International Criminal Court-related body.
Because they are dealing with the same subject matter, they are dealing
with the same types of challenges that come up, and so establishing a
repository of helpful information and human and other resources to share
for these types of initiatives, has to be a positive thing.339

Others strongly voiced the view that the ICC was not a
“development organization” and not the entity to engage in the actual
capacity-building work.340 Thus, generally, it seemed interviewees
337. Interview with Carsten Stahn, supra note 22.
338. Comments by ICC Official, ASP, The Hague, Netherlands (Nov. 2016); see
INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note
305, para. 20; see also Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48 (“The
international agent right now for it is the International Criminal Court, but they
don’t have the resources to take on the entire world on this issue. But of course,
they are sort of a logical clearinghouse.”); Interview with Hassan Jallow, supra
note 3 (“I think the ICC should be encouraged to manage [coordination of
complementarity]. Or else, you are going to build another institution and another
bureaucracy, and other costs again. I think the ICC should be able to do that.”).
339. Interview with Matthew Gillett, supra note 15.
340. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41 (“We simply don’t have a
budget and we’ve been told we don’t have a mandate to develop this kind of
capacity[.]”); Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23 (“[A]s you know the ICC
has always stated it’s not in a capacity-building field.”); Interview with Hassan
Jallow, supra note 3 (“I don’t expect the ICC can provide the funding in order to
implement complementarity. But it can point out the needs, look for the expertise,
and then I think the Member States now have to provide the resources in order to
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envisioned the ICC playing a “facilitation” role.
David Crane opined that States Parties could “create an
academy . . . where people come to The Hague and are trained, and
go back out and prosecute these individuals.”341
Others feared that if a new entity led centralized complementarity
coordination and/or implementation efforts, it might compete with
the ICC’s efforts.
James Stewart thought there would not be “some sort of
centralized and coordinated body” unless the United Nation creates
it.342
Renan Villacis noted that it was not only States Parties who would
need help with capacity-building, but also non-States Parties.343

IV. ADDITIONAL SCENARIOS
Finally, interviewees were also asked whether Scenarios #1–3
represented the most likely and/or most reasonable scenarios to
discuss in terms of the future of the field of international justice, or
whether there were added scenarios that should be considered.
As noted above, one interviewee noted that one could have
included a “Scenario 4,” in which the International Criminal Court
collapses, and a “Scenario 5,” pursuant to which there is a massive
retreat from the international community’s commitment to the field
implement the capacity-building measures.”); Interview with Renan Villacis, supra
note 45 (“The Court as a judicial institution is not called upon to deal with
complementarity. The States Parties have been very clear that there is no specific
mandate for the Court to engage in that type of work.”); Interview with Fatou
Bensouda, supra note 32 (“The ICC, we have to remember, is not a capacitybuilding institution. It is there to support, to do its core business, and wherever we
can support any State that is doing its own domestic proceedings, we will be there
to support them.”).
341. Interview with David Crane, supra note 3 (“[T]he ICC is a center-point to
energize States Parties, to take this burden on themselves. Someone’s got to say
‘we can’t do this. We will be glad to help train you.’”).
342. Interview with James Stewart, supra note 41 (“I don’t think you’re ever
going to get some sort of centralized and coordinated body unless the United
Nations somehow sets something up that really works[.]”).
343. Interview with Renan Villacis, supra note 45 (“[N]ot all the States in the
world, including many who are very active in complementarity issues, are part of
the ICC[.]”).
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of international justice. David Crane explained:
Another scenario is that the International Criminal Court twenty-five
years from now doesn’t exist and that the field of modern international
criminal law is still moving forward . . . but we have the world looking
inward nationally with fewer countries involved. . . . I think it is important
that we think about the fact that the International Criminal Court [could
have] a diminished role in all of this. In fact, we’re already seeing
that. . . . Twenty-five years from now it could be a robust ICC with a
larger group of States Parties working in tandem assisting with
complementarity and teaching our States Parties how to [prosecute]
domestically. . . . I don’t see that happening personally.344

Indeed, while Scenarios #4 and #5 are extreme, the ICC has seen
both “push-back” to its work, and withdrawals made and
threatened,345 so that threats to its future are a distinct possibility. It is
also too soon to know fully what the US administration’s policy to
the ICC will be, although the Court has survived hostility from past
US administrations.346
However, Fatou Bensouda was optimistic both about the future of
the ICC and the field of international justice:
What I disagree with is those who say that international criminal justice
will weaken because there is this fight against multilateralism or
institutions. I don’t think so. I think it will get stronger and stronger. At
the Court, we are receiving demands all the time for the ICC’s
intervention. In all the debates, most of the debates, that you have today
concerning the different conflicts, you always find that the ICC is right
there in the middle, with it being said “what can the ICC do?” Call me an
optimist, but I believe that international criminal justice will become

344. Interview with David Crane, supra note 3 (“It could be a League of
Nations—great idea with a lot of hope, a lot of initial energy, but just dies on the
vine because it just loses the respect that it started with[.]”).
345. See supra Section 1.3(e).
346. US efforts against the ICC during the George W. Bush Administration
consisted of anti-ICC legislation, two resolutions barring the ICC from
investigating possible crimes by peacekeeping forces from non-States Parties (UN
Security Council resolutions 1422 and 1487), the creation of over 100 bilateral
immunity agreements, as well as depositing a note with the UN suspending the
legal force of the US’s signature on the Rome Statute. Bush Administration, AM.
NGO COALITION INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.amicc.org/bush-administration-1
(last visited Mar. 16. 2018).
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stronger, and will manifest itself in these various forms.347

Nicholas Koumjian was also optimistic that international justice is
“here to stay,” because victims now have expectations of
accountability and will demand justice when international crimes
occur:
I think the world has changed in the past twenty-three or twenty-four
years since the ICTY was set up, and what we see now, which is different
than two or three decades ago, that when there’s a conflict like Syria,
North Korea, even domestically, you immediately have people talking
about international crimes, talking about accountability. This wouldn’t
have happened two or three decades ago. So, I do think [international
justice] is here to stay. Victims in the conflicts I’ve handled in many
different countries from different economic levels and different religions,
the feeling of victims that I find is quite universal. They want to see their
suffering recognized and someone held to account for what happened to
them. I think they will continue to demand justice. So, I think [the field] is
here to stay.348

David Scheffer was also optimistic: “I am just staying that I don’t
think international law is going to implode or that international
criminal justice is on some huge deep slide into the oblivion.”349
Others tended to share similar optimism for the future.350
Richard Goldstone downplayed the significance of the three Fall
2016 withdrawals (of which two have since been revoked).351 He
offered a more long-term perspective: “I think that these present
withdrawals will be seen historically to have been an unpleasant few
347. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32.
348. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
349. Interview with David Scheffer, supra note 48.
350. Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23 (“You know, humanity has a
long . . . way to go, but I think this area is here to stay and will hopefully help.”);
Interview with Daryl Mundis, supra note 92 (“The ICC, I don’t think, is in
jeopardy of closing down or being overtaken by other courts and tribunals.”);
Interview with William Schabas, supra note 17 (“[T]here is no assurance that this
is going to keep going . . . but I think that’s increasingly unlikely [international
justice cresting and dying out]. It looks to me like this is here to stay. I guess it’s
because, compared with the past, you have a very solid human rights movement
which is part of the international legal order and, unless that disappears, that’s not
a realistic scenario. This is going to continue[.]”).
351. See supra note 83.
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months, but I don’t think more than that. I don’t think it threatens the
existence of the ICC. I hope I am not being too optimistic, but that is
what I believe.”352
Hassan Jallow also did not foresee a mass retreat from the ICC, or
even a mass African exodus, which has periodically been
threatened.353 Jallow stated:
I think a mass retreat is very improbable. I think Africa remains very
committed to the ICC and to the process for accountability. It still remains
the biggest group, bloc, within the ICC system, and is the only region that
has referred cases to the ICC. . . . I think what is important is for the ICC
also the Rome System to begin to listen to the complaints of the African
region and see how this could be resolved, and to help out Africa also
develop its own, as I said, regional accountability system, you know, to
assist the ICC.354

V. COMBINING SCENARIOS
The above exercise, with three competing scenarios, admittedly
presents something of an artificial choice. As noted above, some
proponents of Scenario #1 (ICC), opined that it needed to be
combined with Scenario #3 (complementarity/domestic capacity), 1
+ 3.355 Various other interviewees thought that the future would
actually combine elements of all three scenarios, 1 + 2 + 3.
For instance, despite initially stating that one could not predict the
future of the field because it was simply “too political,”356 Binta
Mansaray also suggested the future will combine elements of all
352. Interview with Richard Goldstone, supra note 31.
353. See Miyandazi, Apiko & Aggad-Clerx, supra note 140.
354. Interview with Hassan Jallow, supra note 3.
355. See supra Section 1.1(e) (“Combining Scenarios 1 and 3”).
356. Interview with Bintah Mansaray, supra note 199 (Bintah Mansaray initially
took the view that it was simply “too political” whether new tribunals will be set
up, and would be done on a “case-by-case” basis, making it impossible to predict
where the field is heading: “It mainly depends on a case-by-case basis. It depends
on the political situation and more importantly it depends on international
politics. . . . [S]o we don’t actually know where things are moving to be able to
determine in twenty years whether it should be complementarity or whether we
will have hybrid courts like the Special Court for Sierra Leone, or the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, or whether the International Criminal Court will be the
dominant court that would be policing the world, or bringing people to account. It
is too premature to make that prediction.”).
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three scenarios:
Our hope, as I mentioned is that domestic courts be strengthened. The
value in doing so is that it would assist national governments to be able to
nip in the bud, any crimes . . . war crimes or skirmishes before it even gets
to the international level. Again, as I mentioned, that does not take away
the fact that in some situations, in some context you would have hybrid
courts like the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, or the Special Court for
Sierra Leone. . . . At times you would have a need for the International
Criminal Court and why is that? Assuming you are dealing with a head of
state. No domestic court can bring to account a head of state even if it is
there in theory; in practice it will not happen. So, you need courts that
have teeth like the International Criminal Court, or even the Special Court
for Sierra Leone. 357

Gregory Townsend opined likewise that there will be all three
scenarios:
[T]hat’s the trend I see is all three [scenarios] increasing. . . . We will
have a larger, more robust ICC, I hope, able to handle more concurrent
situations, hopefully more geographically diverse, all throughout the
world amongst State Parties, other regional [tribunals] filling gaps, and
international capacity-building, the use of rosters and [Justice Rapid
Response] and that sort of international deployment and also NGOs and
States building freestanding domestic capacities. . . .358

Nicholas Koumjian also envisioned a combined approach:
I think the most likely outcome would be a combination of all of these.
Obviously domestic courts will always have a role if a State has the
capacity. Most States will want to exercise jurisdiction that they have over
their own nationals or over conflicts that occur in their territory where
there are victims. Whether the international community likes that or not, I
think that States will exercise jurisdiction similar to the Bangladesh
Tribunal that’s been set up. I think the ICC is probably going to be around
and it fills a niche. It’s still growing. We are seeing some pickup in
activity and as long as [it] remains 100 or plus members of the Court, I
think it will have a role to play. On the other hand, I do think it is very
likely that there are ad hoc or mixed tribunals. They fill a niche that they
think the ICC can’t fill and that domestic courts in some instances can’t
fill because either the State does not have the capacity (either the will or

357. Id.
358. Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15.
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the capacity) to do the cases in the way that will have the confidence of
the victims of the international community, or because it is seen that any
domestic prosecution will be too biased.359

A number of other interviewees also suggested a combination of
scenarios was realistic.360
Professor William Schabas opined: “I think a decade ago the
attitude was: this is it now, don’t talk about any competitors, we [the
ICC] are the new, permanent institution, and there’s nothing else.
And now I think there’s an acceptance that there’s actually lots of
room for other institutions so I think that’s a part of the future.”361
Carsten Stahn posited there would be justice “4D”:
I think we actually will have justice “4D” basically: the domestic, the
regional, the international, and the hybrid. So, we will have a 4D picture
in the future. I don’t think the fact that we have an ICC actually should
preclude hybrid approaches and other mechanisms that complement the
Court, nor does complementarity in national jurisdictions fully supplant or
basically replace the needs for certain hybrid and situation-driven
mechanisms. In these situations, you will need to find basically an
appropriate traditional formula and precisely our lesson, of course, in
many cases [is] in a lot of conflict situations, obviously national
authorities are not the best forum to deal with these investigations and
prosecutions. So, there will remain a certain need for hybrid mechanisms
being established—basically sometimes maybe even established in
traditional scenarios.362

Carsten Stahn also pondered whether tribunals will be at the
359. Interview with Nicholas Koumjian, supra note 95.
360. Interview Fatou Bensouda, supra note 32 (“This is why, of the scenarios
that you mention, I think there is a possibility for any of them to be. Mainly 1 and
3, but also there is the possibility that 2 could happen.”); Interview with Serge
Brammertz, supra note 68 (“I think at the end of the day it will be a mix of the
three.”); Interview with Robert Petit, supra note 23 (“I think the future will look a
little bit like all three of your scenarios”); Interview with David Scheffer, supra
note 48 (“I think the more sophisticated speculation is that there will have to be
some sort of combination [of types of tribunals].”).
361. Interview with William Schabas, supra note 17 (“We’ve never had this and
I think that’s kind of the future. . . . [W]hen we look at a situation like DRC for
example, that’s really a place for a specialized tribunal [in addition to the
ICC][.]”).
362. Interview with Carsten Stahn, supra note 22.
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forefront, or whether transitional justice mechanisms might supplant
them:
The first question I think is, “will traditional institutions at all be at the
forefront of this or are there alternative plans which might actually
become as important, or maybe even more important, than classical
traditional institutions?” So, I think particularly from transitional justice,
from bottom up approaches, we’ve seen more and more critics of the
effectiveness and the efficiency of these classical international courts. So,
I think that criticism will continue. . . . [Some will continue to] look
critically at whether these institutions fulfill their functions and whether
their mandates actually are accomplished.363

To date, in fact, the more comprehensive prosecutorial approaches
have occurred where there were layers or tiers of justice
mechanisms. Thus, for instances, to address crimes in BosniaHerzegovina there have been three tiers of prosecutions: the ICTY;
the hybrid State Court in Bosnia; and local cantonal and district
courts.364 Similarly, for crimes perpetrated during the Rwandan
genocide, there have also been three tiers of prosecutions: the ICTR
prosecuting top-level perpetrators in Arusha, Tanzania; mid-level
perpetrators tried in domestic courts in Rwanda; and the remainder
tried before Inyiko-Gacaca in Rwanda.365 These models suggest that
for any large-scale crime scene one actually needs multiple levels of
prosecutions through different mechanisms.
The existence of such levels of justice then presents the distinct
possibility that one should view Scenarios #1, #2, and #3 as
complementary to each other. While there might be hybrid tribunals
designed to try top-level perpetrators that would obviate the need for
363. Id. This study does not intend to exclude the role of transitional justice,
although it does not assume transitional justice would supplant tribunals.
364. Jennifer Trahan & Iva Vukusic, The ICTY and the Three-Tiered Approach
to Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in LEGACIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
ACCOUNT (Carsten Stahn et al. eds., forthcoming Oxford Univ. Press 2018).
365. Rwanda: Justice After Genocide—20 Years On, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar.
28, 2014, 6:02 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/rwanda-justice-aftergenocide-20-years (discussing the different levels of justice); Waldorf, supra note
265, at 48 (noting that Inyiko-Gacaca in Rwanda was an adaptation of a “local
dispute resolution mechanism” that was used for genocide trials in helping Rwanda
cope with the numbers of accused in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide).

2018]

FUTURE OF THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

933

the ICC (for instance a court like the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
which had the mandate to try only those with the “greatest
responsibility”),366 there might alternatively be a hybrid or regional
tribunal designed to prosecute at the mid-level, which might
complement the ICC.367 National court prosecutions, ideally, will
always operate to prosecute at least lower-level perpetrators, and
thus, the building of complementarity/ domestic capacity is
necessary even if one does not endorse Scenario #3 as the future
dominant model.
Daryl Mundis shared his views on the need for multiple layers of
justice:
I think it’s really clear as well from the experience we’ve had at an
international level, that no court, no single international court is going to
be able to hold accountable all perpetrators [in Syria] from the most
senior level down, actually shooters or actual torturers. It’s just not
possible. So, what we need to be doing is thinking conceptually about
courts at different levels in different regions in different places that will
address the different levels of responsibility for the crimes. So, the
international community might be directing its efforts at one level.
Regional efforts might be done for secondary levels. Local courts or
hybrid courts, international involvement in domestic courts, again going
back to complementarity. You can look at complementarity in a variety of
different ways and of course you could have complementarity at a variety
of different levels streaming down from very senior level perpetrators
being held accountable in an international ad hoc tribunal down to lowerlevel perpetrators being tried at local courts with perhaps intermediate
level perpetrators being tried in national courts, but with international
judges present.368

Hassan Jallow also proposed multiple institution: “The ICC will
remain” but only to handle “cases when the national systems can’t
366. U.N. Security Council, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the establishment
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶ 1.1, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/2000/915].
367. Interview with Richard Goldstone, supra note 31 (Richard Goldstone,
however, did not share this view that a hybrid could complement the ICC, stating,
“I don’t see an alternative [to the ICC]. I can’t see hybrids or mixed criminal courts
being set up where the ICC has jurisdiction. It would be an utter waste of money to
reinvent, as the United Stated wanted to do for Darfur, during George W. Bush’s
Administration, rather than get the Security Council to refer.”).
368. Interview with Daryl Mundis, supra note 92.
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handle [them].” For those, “the bulk of the work will be done by the
national jurisdictions and regional courts and hybrid courts.”369
Gregory Townsend endorsed levels of prosecutions:
I’d like to see if I can say it, the “smaller lesser fish” being tried
domestically on a complementarity model; something in the middle for
the hybrids and regionals; and then those situations that really require
international independence, impartiality, that those go up to the ICC.
Those [who] bear the greatest responsibility, . . . the most expensive cases
have to be reserved for the highest levels.370

Thus, just as none of the above scenarios excludes the existence of
additional transitional justice tools to complement prosecutions (truth
commissions, reparations, vetting, truth-telling, institutional reforms,
memorials, etc.),371 and the use of universal jurisdiction, ideally,
Scenarios #1, #2, and #3 may also complement each other. And,
ideally, transitional justice tools will also complement each other,
rather than a country relying on solely one.372

CONCLUSION
The field of international justice is certainly entwined with
political constraints, and faces limitations due to competition for
donor funding. The political constraints make long-term planning in
the field extremely difficult. Possibly the best the international
community can do is the current ad hoc approach—that each time
there are mass atrocity crimes still occurring (as there still
unfortunately are), the international community, or particular actors,
try to ensure that either ICC prosecutions occur, another tribunal can
prosecute the crimes, or that assistance is provided to the domestic
369. Interview with Hassan Jallow, supra note 3.
370. Interview with Gregory Townsend, supra note 15.
371. Traditional or local “justice” mechanisms such as ones found in Acholi
areas of Northern Uganda, and in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and East Timor, may
also play a role. See, e.g., Waldorf, supra note 265.
372. Interview with Richard Goldstone, supra note 31 (reflecting on the
accomplishments of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
stating “[T]he greatest gift of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission is we have one history of what happened during the apartheid years
with regards to serious crimes. . . . [But,] “there weren’t sufficient reparations and
there were insufficient prosecutions.”).
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system to conduct prosecutions—that is, if any of these approaches is
politically feasible. Yet, it still seems a worthwhile endeavor to
examine the field as a whole and try to engage in long-term
reflection, so that perhaps responses in each situation will not always
be ad hoc.
This study has not attempted to predict the future, but has
suggested some variables of how the ICC of the future might look,
the role of hybrid or regional tribunals in the future, and whether
complementarity/capacity-building might need more centralized
coordination, and, if so, how to achieve that.
Many interviewees suggested that the future is likely going to
contain some elements of all the scenarios—and one would hope this
could be the case—that there will be multiple tiers of prosecutions in
any country that requires such a robust approach to justice. And,
while not a focus, this study acknowledges the important role other
transitional justice tools can play, as well as universal jurisdiction
prosecutions. Of course, none of these mechanisms can take the
place of preventing the crimes in the first place, which should always
be the priority, as justice after mass atrocities occur is always a
second-best solution.
While remarkable progress has been made in this field over the
last twenty-plus years, it will be crucial to continue this forward
momentum, analyzing soberly where the field stands (including
assessing difficulties encountered) and where best to try to direct it
(despite the obstacles that will no doubt arise). Maybe, someday,
these institutions will not be needed, because there will have been
enough prosecutions of atrocity crimes and global acceptance of
norms of international criminal law that would-be perpetrators are
finally deterred from committing the crimes.

936

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:4

APPENDIX A
INTERVIEWEES (IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY WERE INTERVIEWED):
Robert Petit
Founding International CoProsecutor, The Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
Hassan Jallow

Former Prosecutor,
International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda; current Chief
Justice of The Gambia

David Crane

Founding Chief Prosecutor, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone

David Scheffer

Former US War Crimes
Ambassador; UN SecretaryGeneral Special Expert on UN
Assistance to the Khmer Rouge
Trials

Nicholas Koumjian
International Co-Prosecutor,
The Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
Brenda Hollis

Former Chief Prosecutor, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone;
Prosecutor, The Residual
Special Court for Sierra Leone

Stephen Rapp

Former Chief Prosecutor, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone;
former US War Crimes
Ambassador & Head of the
Office of Global Criminal
Justice

Hans Corell

Former Under-SecretaryGeneral for Legal Affairs and
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Legal Counsel of the United
Nations
James Stewart
International Criminal Court

Deputy Prosecutor,

Binta Mansaray

Former Registrar, Special Court
for Sierra Leone; Registrar
Residual Special Court for
Sierra Leone

Joseph Kamara

Anti-Corruption Commissioner,
Attorney-General and Minister
of Justice, Sierra Leone

William Schabas

Professor of International Law,
Middlesex University, London;
Professor of International
Criminal Law and Human
Rights, Leiden University

Serge Brammertz

Prosecutor, the Mechanism for
International Courts and
Tribunals; former Prosecutor,
International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia

Judge Carmel Agius

Former President, International
Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia

Gregory Townsend

Former Chief of the Court
Support Services Section,
International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia

Matthew Gillett

Trial Lawyer, Office of the
Prosecutor, International
Criminal Court; formerly
International Criminal Tribunal
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for the former Yugoslavia,
Office of the Prosecutor,
appeals counsel and trial
attorney
Carsten Stahn

Professor of International
Criminal Law and Global
Justice, Leiden Law School

Renan Villacis

Director of the Secretariat of
the International Criminal
Court’s Assembly of States
Parties

Daryl Mundis
Lebanon

Registrar, Special Tribunal for

Richard Goldstone

Founding Chief Prosecutor,
International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia &
International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda

Fatou Bensouda
Criminal Court

Prosecutor, International

[Many interviewees have held, or do hold, additional positions.
The above list includes either the current, and/or most significant
past, position(s).
All interviewees spoke in their individual
capacities and not on behalf of the UN or the particular tribunals with
which they are currently or were previously affiliated.]
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APPENDIX B
SIGNIFICANCE
The urgency and complexity of international prosecutions often
deprive practitioners of opportunities to step back and assess the
bigger picture and think strategically about preparing for the future.
This project invited international justice specialists to take a step
back from dealing with the crisis of the moment and look at the
bigger trajectory of where the field ought to be heading over the next
twenty years. There is a strategic significance to this. If the
international justice field fails to put in motion preparations for
developments that may arise in the future, it will be ill-equipped to
address them.
The international community constantly grapples with these very
significant questions—the next biggest challenge will be addressing
atrocity crimes in Syria—but it does not necessarily do so with the
benefit of structured long-term vision. Nor does it agree on criteria
for measuring effectiveness. It is therefore valuable to identifying the
rationales behind currently favored institutional options. A key longterm objective is to achieve maximum impact (in terms of the
greatest number, and/or highest level, prosecutions pursuant to
internationally accepted fair trial standards, and incorporation of at
least some level of local ownership), while minimizing donor fatigue
and minimizing impunity gaps.
Another reason the study is significant is because it hopefully
deepens and helps to structure conversations amongst experts in the
field. The goal of such reflections is to improve strategic thinking
regarding the field.

TIMELINESS/COMPELLING RATIONALE AND UNIQUE HISTORICAL
MOMENT
The field of international justice stands at a crossroads, where
most practitioners have maintained and some continue to maintain
that the international community can rely upon the International
Criminal Court to lead the bulk of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity prosecutions of the future. Yet, the Court is
underfunded and beleaguered by political attacks and other
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difficulties. Moreover, in the current political environment—with the
current US administration, attempted withdrawal from the Rome
Statute by three African States (with only one ultimately leaving),
“unsigning” or the Rome Statute by Russia, and withdrawal by the
Philippines, one can anticipate further “push-back” not just against
the ICC but possibly the whole field of international justice.
It would be extremely useful for those working in the field to
examine whether we are moving along the most effective trajectory,
or need to develop an alternative model, that includes the creation of
more tribunals, and creates some kind of centralized mechanism to
strengthen the domestic capacities in local courts around the world.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION & DATA
The findings contained in this article are based on
information/data gathered in two primary ways. The first source of
information/data consists of interviews by the author of key
individuals: current international and hybrid tribunal prosecutors, as
well as other experts.373 This “key informant” method is appropriate
to an inquiry of this kind, because of the role of these experts in both
shaping the international justice field and in determining its future
direction. The interviews were con ducted primarily in September–
November 2016 in Nuremberg, Germany, and The Hague,
Netherlands.
The second source of information/data was an innovative
approach to stimulating strategic thinking: a “scenarios workshop”
held at NYU’s Center for Global Affairs on February 10, 2017,
organized by the author, with the assistance of CGA Professor
Michael Oppenheimer and then-CGA student, Heather Craig.
Oppenheimer offers extensive expertise in developing detailed
projections of future scenarios and testing them against assumptions
regarding future conditions. The scholarly debate assessing the three
models for the future of international justice provided added
information/data for analysis. The exposure of experts to questions
regarding the three scenarios was also designed to facilitate strategic
thinking about the viability of the different approaches. This also
373. See supra Appendix A.
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hopefully encouraged strategic thinking about the field. As noted,
these findings have been separately reported.374

374. Trahan, supra note 8.

